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PROFIT OR SAFETY: WHERE IS OUTER SPACE HEADED?
PAUL B. LARSEN*

ABSTRACT
The space powers (the U.S., the European Space Agency
(ESA), China, and Russia) are now preparing national space
traffic regimes with insufficient regard for the Outer Space
Treaty’s (OST) agreed “Principles Governing the Activities of
States in Exploration and Use of Outer Space.” The rapidly
growing traffic of satellites, resulting in space debris, and the
scarcity of radio frequencies and related orbits create obvious
dangerous situations. States, including the U.S., agreed in the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS) on twenty-one Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of Space, some of which relate to space traffic management (STM). UNCOPUOS is also beginning work on
common STM practices. Yet the United States’ space management policy—pronounced in two White House policy statements by former-President Trump—anchors U.S. STM policy on
a “light touch” management, which diverges from ongoing STM
efforts in the UNCOPUOS, the ESA, and the Russo-Chinese
outer space alliance. The two White House policy statements assign U.S. STM policy leadership to the Department of Commerce (DOC) based on the management of traffic data
provided by private industry and government sources. The DOC
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LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (2d ed. 2017) and of PAUL B.
LARSEN, JOSEPH C. SWEENEY & JOHN E. GILLICK, AVIATION LAW: CASES, LAWS AND
RELATED SOURCES (2d ed. 2012), as well as many law review articles on outer
space. He also served as Senior International Lawyer, Office of the Secretary of
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contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration
(NAPA) for a study of and recommendations on best STM management. NAPA’s report accepted the two White House policy
statements and made recommendations accordingly but with insufficient consideration of international space law, guidelines,
and subsequent policy priorities.
This Article analyzes the NAPA Report, criticizing it for inadequate consideration of international space law and failure to adequately consider the interests of all stakeholders—in particular
the science and astronomy communities. The NAPA Report pays
insufficient attention to important government policies on climate change, energy, astronomy, and national security, which
are top priorities of the current administration. The Article recommends adherence to applicable international law. It stresses
that space traffic safety by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is more important than space traffic promotion by DOC.
It recommends (1) separating FAA regulation of operational
management of safety in space from the promotion of the space
commerce industry and (2) assigning a different administration
in the Department of Transportation (DOT) to handle economic regulation and promotion. Doing so would adopt a separation policy similar to the one applied in air commerce. It then
recommends the establishment of an international outer space
agency to supervise international space traffic rules of the road.
Finally, this Article suggests that U.S. commercial space policy
decisions be made in the context of related U.S. policies on science, astronomy, climate change, and renewable solar energy.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HIS ARTICLE TAKES AN international view of outer space
traffic management (STM) based on the Outer Space
Treaty (OST),1 which is binding on all states,2 in contrast to the

Relevant treaties include the following:
• Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18
T.I.A.S. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
• Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023
U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
• Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
• Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S.
119.
• Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1979 Moon Agreement].
2 See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 50 (2d ed. 2017)
(arguing that the principles in OST are now customary and therefore binding on
all states); The Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space Law
(IISL) has also stated:
[T]here is growing importance for national regulators responsible
for the authorization and continuing supervision of outer space activities to give careful consideration to the interests of all stakeholders, including the scientific community and the public, regarding
the consequences of authorizing such activities for the future ex1
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National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) report’s
unilateral STM.3
Currently, outer space faces a safety crisis, which must be resolved.4 An annual average of 12.5 known collisions resulting in
space debris occur every year, with half occurring due to satellites orbiting in low Earth orbit (LEO).5 Why? Because states do
not bother to remove their debris and defunct satellites.6 The
International Space Station (ISS) was even recently impacted by
space debris.7 Orbits, particularly LEO, are becoming increasingly congested and unsafe due to increased commercial traffic

ploration and peaceful uses of outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies. . . . [And] to ensure compliance with the
Outer Space Treaty (OST).
Int’l Inst. of Space L., Statement by the Board of Directors of the International
Institute of Space Law (IISL) on the Consideration of the Interests of the Public
and Other Stakeholders in the Authorization and Continuing Supervision of
Commercial Space Activities (July 19, 2021) [hereinafter IISL Statement], https:/
/iislweb.space/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/IISL_Statement_Authorization_
and_continuing_supervision_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6LE-ENNG].
3 See NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF
THE FEASIBILITY, EXPECTED EFFECTIVENESS, AND FUNDING IMPLICATIONS OF A TRANSFER OF SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 1, 7 (2020) [hereinafter NAPA
REPORT], https://napawash.org/uploads/NAPA_OSC_Final_Report.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/26HE-GHHB] (identifying the report’s commission from Congress
was to identify a U.S. agency to handle STM matters); see also Outcomes of the European Space Traffic Management Conference, 7 July 2021: “Fostering a European Approach
on Space Traffic Management,” SPACEWATCH.GLOBAL [hereinafter European STM Report], https://spacewatch.global/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/STM_Outcome.
pdf [https://perma.cc/KN3Q-BDYH].
4 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 7.
5 ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE ENVIRONMENT REPORT, EUR. SPACE AGENCY 4 (2021),
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/ESA_s_Space_Environment_
Report_2021 [https://perma.cc/JTZ6-2X3C]; see Tereza Pultarova, SpaceX Starlink Satellites Responsible for Over Half of Close Encounters in Orbit, Scientist Says,
SPACE.COM (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellite-colli
sion-alerts-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/C9SA-RL4J].
6 ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 5; see, e.g., NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 20–21 (recalling a famous satellite collision involving a
defunct satellite).
7 Denise Chow, Space Junk Damages International Space Station’s Robotic Arm, NBC
NEWS (June 1, 2021, 11:27 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/
space-junk-damages-international-space-stations-robotic-arm-rcna1067 [https://
perma.cc/4WSJ-QW7Q].
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and unmanaged space debris.8 Experts predict that collisions in
outer space will occur with increasing frequency.9
A unilateral piecemeal approach dominates current U.S. policy10 rather than an international effort to establish norms
within the international community. An example is NASA’s
agreement with SpaceX (and its Starlink spacecraft) in 2021 to
avoid collisions between only Starlink and NASA satellites.11 Another example is the United States’ use of multiple bilateral accords with individual space powers, even though other major
space powers have not joined.12 Equally troubling is the current
U.S. policy approach that tracks space traffic but leaves full re8 “LEO . . . is the most congested orbit,” and includes well-known space objects
such as the International Space Station. Pascal Hansens, Space Debris, Orbit Congestion: When Space Needs a Highway Code, EURANET PLUS (July 22, 2021), https://
euranetplus-inside.eu/space-debris-orbit-congestion-when-space-needs-a-highwaycode/ [https://perma.cc/PD3X-T3AW]; LEO Economy FAQs, NASA, https://
www.nasa.gov/leo-economy/faqs [https://perma.cc/YE5G-K6LT] (Feb. 25,
2021); Joey Roulette, Debris from Test of Russian Antisatellite Weapon Forces Astronauts
to Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/science/russia-antisatellite-missile-test-debris.html [https://perma.cc/3NFK-39RL] (Nov. 16, 2021).
9 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 8; Göktuğ Karacalioğlu, Impact of New Satellite
Launch Trends on Orbital Debris, SPACE SAFETY MAG. (June 5, 2016), https://
www.spaceflightinsider.com/missions/earth-science/impact-new-satellite-launchtrends-orbital-debris/ [https://perma.cc/HDG6-7WCX]. Current regulation of
space traffic can be summarized as: “For right of way, the regulatory framework is
please don’t crash your satellite, and really please don’t crash it into someone
else.” Jeff Foust, From Space Traffic Awareness to Space Traffic Management,
SPACENEWS (Oct. 20, 2021) (quoting Ruth Stilwell, Executive Director of Aerospace Policy Solutions), https://spacenews.com/from-space-traffic-awareness-tospace-traffic-management/ [https://perma.cc/C62H-K8FH].
10 See generally Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,901 (May 24, 2018) [hereinafter Space Policy
Directive-2], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05-30/pdf/201811769.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ENU-S3XX]; Space Policy Directive-3, National
Space Traffic Management Policy, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,969 (June 18, 2018) [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-3], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-0621/pdf/2018-13521.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCV9-DRJ5].
11 NONREIMBURSABLE SPACE ACT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP
FOR FLIGHT SAFETY COORDINATION WITH NASA ASSETS (2021) [hereinafter NASA
AGREEMENT WITH SPACEX], https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/nasa-spacex_starlink_agreement_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N28Q-LG3S].
12 See, e.g., NASA, THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS: PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN THE
CIVIL EXPLORATION AND USE OF THE MOON, MARS, COMETS, AND ASTEROIDS FOR
PEACEFUL PURPOSES (2020) [hereinafter THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS], https://
www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed13Oct2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAA6-BXZB] (showing only nine state signatories); see also Ruth Stilwell & Christian Zur, Conjunction Risk Drives Need for Information Sharing, SPACENEWS (Apr. 21, 2021), https://spacenews.com/op-ed-
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sponsibility to avoid collisions on commercial satellite operators.13 Notably, China,14 Russia,15 and other space powers16 do
not accept U.S. policy.
The central point of this Article is that non-sovereign outer
space is inherently international. One nation cannot control all
traffic—most space objects, whether commercial or space debris, are not under U.S. control.17 Therefore, the U.S. needs to
cooperate with other states to establish international traffic
norms within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) instead of focusing on individualistic objectives.18 Perhaps a new civilian United Nations
(U.N.) subagency for outer space will need to be created to appease the non-sovereignty element of outer space.
Presently, the U.S. is at a space policy crossroad. All parties
involved19—whether commercial, scientific, or military—agree
on the need for outer space rules of the road.20 The Trump administration issued several White House policy statements assigning the Department of Commerce (DOC) as the lead within
the U.S. government based on a “light touch” data management
regulation of space traffic.21 The light touch policy essentially
expresses economist Milton Friedman’s philosophy that the purpose of business is “to use its resources and engage in activities
conjunction-risk-drives-need-for-information-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/9GUJWM6J].
13 See Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 10, § 4.
14 See Mark Whittington, The New Race to the Moon: The Artemis Alliance vs. the
Sino-Russian Axis, THE HILL: OPINION (Mar. 28, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://
thehill.com/opinion/technology/545280-the-new-race-to-the-moon-the-artemisalliance-vs-the-sino-russian-axis [https://perma.cc/AX7T-9H4N].
15 Id.
16 See THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 12.
17 Dave Mosher & Samantha Lee, More Than 14,000 Hunks of Dangerous Space
Junk Are Hurtling Around Earth—Here’s Who Put It All Up There, BUS. INSIDER (Mar.
29, 2018, 8:29 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/space-junk-debris-amountstatistics-countries-2018-3 [https://perma.cc/5NFW-3EN9].
18 See IISL Statement, supra note 2.
19 The NAPA Report considers too few stakeholders. See discussion infra Section IV.E.4. For comparison, see Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space: How Shall the World’s
Governments Establish Order Among Competing Interests?, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 1, 4–16
(2019).
20 C. Todd Lopez, There Must Be Rules for How We Use Space, Defense Leaders Say,
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (May 6, 2021), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/
Article/Article/2598395/there-must-be-rules-for-how-we-use-space-defense-leaders-say/ [https://perma.cc/VD7T-PX87].
21 See Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 10, § 4.
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designed to increase its profits”22 rather than assume social responsibilities. Such an approach involves maximum self-government by commercial space23 with minimum oversight by the
DOC.24
With congressional approval, the DOC requested NAPA to
study and evaluate the organizational change proposed by the
Trump administration.25 The NAPA Report, issued at the end of
2020, is based on and supports the Trump administration’s policies.26 Many of its conclusions are troublesome: it assumes that
commercial promotion is the government’s most important objective in regulating space commerce;27 it considers STM as a
U.S. management issue and not as an international coordination issue governed by the 1967 OST and other space law treaties;28 and it recommends legislative delegation of overall STM

22 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/
09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-isto.html [https://perma.cc/XBW8-D66G]; cf. infra note 268 and accompanying
text.
23 The term “commercial space” in this Article refers to the non-governmental
commercial operators engaged in business in outer space.
24 See Kevin O’Connell, Director, Off. of Space Com., U.S. Dep’t of Com., Keynote Address at the 13th Annual Eilene M. Galloway Memorial Symposium: Advancing Space Commerce: What Does “Light Touch, Permissive Regulation”
Mean? (Dec. 5, 2018).
25 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 8–10.
26 See id. at 9–10, 34–35. The NAPA Report was issued in 2020. Consequently, it
fails to consider important subsequent space traffic developments, such as the
November 16, 2021, intentional collision of a Russian antisatellite missile with an
old Russian satellite, which added thousands of additional space debris pieces to
the already congested outer space traffic. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Acknowledges Antisatellite Missile Test That Created a Mess in Space, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/world/europe/russia-antisatellite-missile-test.html [https://perma.cc/8J92-A8T8]. Holger Krag, Head of ESA’s
Space Safety Programme, states that the Russian weapon test in outer space “will
not only more than double the long-term collision avoidance needs for missions
in orbits with similar altitudes, but will furthermore significantly increase the
probability of potentially mission-terminating collisions at lower altitudes.” When
Debris Disaster Strikes, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.esa.int/
Safety_Security/Space_Debris/When_debris_disaster_strikes [https://perma.cc/
JD4F-TUFW].
27 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 63 (stating that in selecting a regulatory
agency, “a core objective is to grow the space commercial marketplace”).
28 See generally id. at 85–103 (capabilities based on functional and technical
competency, organizational leadership and capacity, partnerships, and stakeholders and customers).
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functions to the DOC.29 The delegation has not happened yet
because the implementation of the presidential orders requires
legislative authority and budget authority, which Congress has
not provided.30
The situation is confusing because the U.S. is a member of
UNCOPUOS, which recently issued its Guidelines for LongTerm Sustainability of Space (LTS Guidelines) addressing space
traffic.31 The U.S., China, Russia, and virtually all other states
have agreed and accepted the new guidelines, which this Article
discusses.32 UNCOPUOS is now beginning to work on the STM
issue.33 The light touch policy recommended in the NAPA Report would only have a national effect, whereas the UNCOPUOS guidelines are the international rules of the road.34
Thus, the NAPA Report, which is still waiting on congressional
action, is at odds with the U.S. international position in
UNCOPUOS.
How did outer space become such a dangerous, ungoverned
environment? In 1967, at the time of the OST, burgeoning nongovernmental traffic was not anticipated.35 That shocking in29 See id. at 3. The NAPA Report assumes that the rest of the world will go
along with and will adopt such a regulatory policy. See id; see also discussion infra
Section III.D.2.
30 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 4; see also OST, supra note 1, art. VI.
31 See discussion infra Section III.C.1.a.
32 Press Release, Off. for Outer Space Affs., Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space Adopted, U.N. Press Release UNIS/OS/518 (June 22, 2019), https://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/media/2019-unis-os-518.html
[https://perma.cc/G7BV-2XHS]. See generally Jeff Foust, Long-Awaited Space Sustainability Guidelines Approved by UN Committee, SPACENEWS (June 28, 2019), https:/
/spacenews.com/long-awaited-space-sustainability-guidelines-approved-by-uncommittee/ [https://perma.cc/79FL-J9KX].
33 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm. on Its
Sixtieth Session, Annotated Provisional Agenda, ¶12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/
L.317 (Apr. 12, 2021) [hereinafter UNCOPUOS Adoption]. Furthermore, the
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, at its 2021 session, will have informal consultations on use of space resources led by Andrzej Misztal (Poland) and Steven
Freeland (Australia). Id. at Annotations, ¶14. The panel discussion of the European space agencies’ leaders with their North American counterparts at the 36th
Space Symposium, held on August 23, 2021, in Colorado Springs, indicated that
European leaders favor development of international STM standards within the
United Nations framework. Marc Boucher, Space Agency Leaders Meet in Colorado
Springs, SPACEQ (Sept. 1, 2021), https://spaceq.ca/space-agency-leaders-meet-incolorado-springs/ [https://perma.cc/XN2T-9P2W].
34 Cf. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
35 See Matt Weinzierl & Mehak Sarang, The Commercial Space Age Is Here: Private
Space Travel Is Just the Beginning, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 12, 2021), https://
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crease occurred in the last couple of decades, outstripping slow
governmental traffic management.36 Now the risk of collision in
outer space is a common situation.37 The drastic increase of
commercial space traffic and the current prospect of further
growth, combined with growing space debris, severely strain and
endanger all space traffic. Commercial operators have a strong
interest in the safety of their space objects. However, how can
they protect their space objects when they do not control space
objects belonging to other commercial, military, and governmental operators?38 An even greater cause of concern is that no
state has control over space debris orbits. Although the U.S. Air
Force is tracking some, most are unidentified.39
Comprehensive management of issues such as collision
threats and outer space safety is not contrary to space commerce
objectives, but it is in the self-interest of commercial space operators. Management of the entire compendium of moving parts
in outer space should be part of a central body that does not
favor individual operators or groups of operators to ensure
safety objectives maintain their integrity. Currently, UNCOPUOS is the only civilian body to organize that task, especially since UNCOPUOS placed STM on its agenda.
Part II of this Article describes how our current crisis in overcrowded, almost unregulated outer space. Part III examines the
hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here [https://perma.cc/W42GY7ML].
36 See generally John M. Logsdon, Space Exploration: Commercial Space Transportation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/space-exploration/Commercial-space-transportation [https://perma.cc/C7AN-5MDH]
(Oct. 25, 2021).
37 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1; see also Paul B. Larsen, Minimum International Norms for Managing Space Traffic, Space Debris, and Near Earth Object Impacts,
83 J. AIR L. & COM. 739, 777 (2018).
38 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 15; Larsen, supra note 37, at 748–49; see
also Marlon E. Sorge, William H. Ailor & Ted J. Muelhaupt, Space Traffic Management: The Challenge of Large Constellations, Orbital Debris, and the Rapid Changes in
Space Operations, SPACE AGENDA 2021, Sept. 2020, at 2 [hereinafter SPACE AGENDA
2021], https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Sorge_STM_202009
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F77-D3WN]; U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 1 (2021) [hereinafter LTS Guidelines],
https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2021/stspace/stspace
79_0_html/st_space79E.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG4W-3TJG]; discussion infra
Section III.C.1.a.
39 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 15; Space Debris and Human Spacecraft,
NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html
[https://perma.cc/3UNH-SW4N] (May 27, 2021).
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United States’ and other states’ efforts to be safe and commercially viable at the same time. Part IV compares different management approaches. Part V looks at the most effective way to
establish STM in the near future. Finally, Part VI concludes by
summarizing the largest and most essential pieces that should
shape the New Space policy.
II.
A.

GROWTH

THE CURRENT CRISIS
OF

COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES

New Space, as modern outer space has become known, is
characterized by a drastic increase in the number of space objects in orbit.40 The growth is an international development: the
European Space Agency (ESA) reports that there are currently
more than 170 million space objects larger than one millimeter
in orbit.41 Of these, 670,000 are larger than one centimeter, and
29,000 of these objects are larger than ten centimeters.42 Orbiting satellites are registered in the registry established by the
U.N. under the Registration Convention.43 The U.N. Office for
Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) reported 5,774 individual objects registered with the U.N. in orbit (2,666 of which are active)
as of the end of March 2020.44 Of these, 1,454 are listed as commercial.45 That number has subsequently increased, primarily by
SpaceX and OneWeb’s launch of many small satellites.46 The
number of registered objects rose almost 16% between 2019 and
2020.47 Prospectively, SpaceX has permission to launch 42,000
satellites, and China reportedly plans to launch thousands of
satellites.48 Some predictions estimate 20,000 new satellites will
40 See Glenn Peterson, Marlon Sorge & William Ailor, Space Traffic Management
in the Age of New Space, AEROSPACE CORP. 5 (Apr. 2018), https://aerospace.org/
sites/default/files/2018-05/SpaceTrafficMgmt_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9UVTL4T]; NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
41 How Many Space Debris Objects Are Currently in Orbit?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY,
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/
How_many_space_debris_objects_are_currently_in_orbit [https://perma.cc/
KF3Y-KK46].
42 Id.
43 See Registration Convention, supra note 1, arts. III–IV.
44 How Many Satellites Are Orbiting the Earth in 2020?, PIXALYTICS (May 27, 2020),
https://www.pixalytics.com/satellites-orbiting-earth-2020/ [https://perma.cc/
6U6C-VG2U].
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 Irene Klotz, Burgeoning LEO Belt, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 9–22,
2020, at 54; Timiebi Aganaba, Assistant Professor, Sch. for the Future of Innova-
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be in orbit by 2030.49 These increases relate to commercial satellites, with most expected to be in LEO.50
U.S. Air Force Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC)
tracking is the primary tool for preventing collisions.51 Presently,
it can track thousands of large space objects and warn operators
of prospective collisions.52 The orbiting objects’ maximum
speed of 18,000-miles-per-hour leaves very little time to avoid impacts.53 With rising close encounter reports,54 collisions of space
objects—such as the 2009 collision of Iridium 33 with Cosmos
225155—is likely to occur more frequently.
Furthermore, the number of countries authorizing commercial satellites is rising.56 Operators are therefore subject to different national oversight and operating rules.57 One recent
tion in Soc’y, Ariz. State Univ., Spotlight Talk Speaker at Secure World Foundation Summit for Space Sustainability, Panel 2: Megaconstellations—The Train
Left the Station. Now What? (June 22, 2021) (transcript available at https://
swfound.org/media/207226/panel-2-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5QPDSU6]). OneWeb, now U.K.- and India-owned, will launch 648 satellites by June
2022. Jen DiMascio & Irene Klotz, OneWeb Rolling Out Broadband Service in UK,
Canada and Alaska, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 12–25, 2021, at 42.
49 See, e.g., Klotz, supra note 48, at 54.
50 See Aganaba, supra note 48, at 1; see also Stephen Garber & Marissa Herron,
How Has Traffic Been Managed in the Sky, on Waterways, and on the Road? Comparisons
for Space Situational Awareness (Part 1), SPACE REV. (June 8, 2020), https://
www.thespacereview.com/article/3961/1 [https://perma.cc/9SAL-HC7U].
51 See Garber & Herron, supra note 50.
52 See Sandra Erwin, U.S. Military Keeps Sharp Eyes on Orbit as Congestion Grows,
SPACENEWS (Nov. 3, 2020), https://spacenews.com/u-s-military-keeps-sharp-eyeson-orbit-as-congestion-grows [https://perma.cc/LY9B-LG4X]; discussion infra
Section II.C.
53 Chow, supra note 7.
54 See, e.g., Two Satellites in Close Shave over US City of Pittsburgh, BBC (Jan. 30,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51299638 [https://
perma.cc/D2GZ-HB4Q]; Pultarova, supra note 5.
55 See generally Brian Weeden, 2009 Iridium-Cosmos Collision Fact Sheet, SECURE
WORLD FOUND. 1, https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_colli
sion_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4XB-U8LA] (Nov. 10,
2010).
56 See, e.g., Brian Kim, With Restrictions Lifted, South Korea Launches $13B Space
Power Scheme, DEFENSE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.defensenews.com/
space/2021/09/06/with-restrictions-lifted-south-korea-launches-13b-spacepower-scheme/ [https://perma.cc/VG79-VEPX]; Nick Flaherty, UK Aims to Be
First European Country for Space Launches, EENEWS EUROPE (May 24, 2021), https://
www.eenewseurope.com/news/uk-aims-be-first-european-country-space-launches
[https://perma.cc/85BH-VJUS]; Thomas Erdbrink & Christina Anderson, In
Sweden’s Far North, a Space Complex Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/05/23/world/europe/sweden-space-arctic-satellites.html [https://perma.cc/69JS-W26G] (June 10, 2021).
57 See SPACE AGENDA 2021, supra note 38, at 3.
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example is the uncontrolled deorbiting of a twenty-three-ton
Chinese launch rocket piece and its debris landing unexpectedly near the Maldives.58 States dealing with loosely regulated
space activities face more challenging issues with non-regulated
New Space activities, such as operators extending the lives of
satellites in orbit.59 A variety of activities in orbit makes space
traffic even more complex and thus more difficult to manage.
Furthermore, states are not prepared to supervise the New
Space activities in outer space. The U.S. is an example of a state
that has not yet fully organized management of commercial
space activities. While the U.S. Air Force CSpOC tracks civilian
space objects, the Department of Defense (DOD) prefers that a
civilian U.S. government authority be charged with tracking civilian outer space activities.60 Although private tracking of space
activities does occur, private companies do not have the authority to enforce established operational rules.
B.

SPACE DEBRIS

AND

COMMERCIAL SPACE

Space debris is the greatest danger to commercial space.61
Several situations contribute to its existence. New launches result in rocket debris caused by the launch and collisions with
non-maneuverable, dead, and fragmented satellites.62 Military
conjunctions, such as the intentional collision of a Chinese satellite with a Chinese antisatellite weapon in 2007, also cause debris.63 The primary danger of debris collision with a spacecraft is
closely followed by the secondary effect of a collision creating
more debris, as illustrated by the Iridium-Cosmos 2251 collision
58 Steven Lee Myers & Kenneth Chang, China Says Debris from Its Rocket Landed
Near Maldives, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/science/
china-rocket-reentry-falling-long-march-5b.html [https://perma.cc/ET7G-SPM5]
(June 16, 2021).
59 Devin Coldewey, Another Milestone for In-Space Servicing as Northrop Grumman
Gives Aging Satellite New Life, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2021, 4:21 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/12/another-milestone-for-in-space-servicing-as-northropgrumman-gives-aging-satellite-new-life/ [https://perma.cc/RAK4-WFRR].
60 Garber & Herron, supra note 50; see discussion infra Section IV.E.1 (NAPA
Report’s failure to consider essential implementation of the OST).
61 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 37. The danger of collision in outer space
has recently doubled. Tracking Space Debris Is a Growing Business, THE ECONOMIST,
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/tracking-space-debris-is-agrowing-business/21804756 [https://perma.cc/57HQ-FWUK] (Sept. 16, 2021).
62 About Space Debris, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/
Space_Debris/About_space_debris [https://perma.cc/F5A5-K8DM].
63 Space Debris Mitigation, SPACE SAFETY MAG., https://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/mitigation/ [https://perma.cc/V2UD-S3G9].
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in 2009.64 After the collisions, the debris remains in orbit and
perpetuates the cycle.65 Space operators have had to incorporate
safety procedures in response to these conditions. For example,
on April 24, 2021, a SpaceX spacecraft transporting four astronauts to the ISS was suddenly ordered to prepare for collision
with space debris.66
Although current international space debris guidelines67 cannot control the increase in debris—especially from collisions
that create more and ever-smaller debris swarms68—the UNCOPUOS Space Debris Guidelines (2007 Space Debris Guidelines)69 are generally enforced by individual states. In the U.S.,
the 2007 Space Debris Guidelines are applied and supplemented by NASA.70 They are required for commercial operators
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and for licensing commercial satellites by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).71 The U.S. has strengthened the UNCOPUOS guidelines by its Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard
See Weeden, supra note 55.
See id.
66 See Chow, supra note 7.
67 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2010), https://
www.unoosa.orgpdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7Y5K9NW] [hereinafter 2007 Space Debris Guidelines]; see Paul B. Larsen, Solving the
Space Debris Crisis, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 475, 478 (2018) (discussing the InterAgency Space Debris Coordination Committee’s Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines).
68 This phenomenon is also known as the Kessler Syndrome, which states that
space debris of critical mass will fragment in further collisions leading to a cascading chain of activities. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL RSCH.
2637, 2637 (1978).
69 The Space Debris Guidelines: (1) limit the amount of debris released under
normal operations; (2) minimize potential break-ups and consequent debris; (3)
limit probability of accidental collision; (4) discourage intentional destruction of
space objects; (5) reduce debris from stored energy; (6) limit long-term presence
of defunct satellites in orbit; and (7) limit long-term interference of defunct
spacecraft with geosynchronous Earth orbit. 2007 Space Debris Guidelines, supra
note 67, at 2–4.
70 See
Orbital Debris Management & Risk Mitigation, NASA, https://
www.nasa.gov/pdf/
692076main_Orbital_Debris_Management_and_Risk_Mitigation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GFZ9-HSJG].
71 See Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 10, § 6; see also DANIEL MORGAN,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION (Nov. 29, 2018), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/space/
R45416.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVB6-A8BC].
64
65
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Practices (ODMSP), updated and improved in 2019.72 U.S. government operators are required to comply with the ODMSP.73
Furthermore, the FCC recently proposed that commercial operators be required to post a bond to ensure payment for potential
damages caused by debris from that operator’s launched
satellites.74
Commercial operators can only do their best to avoid large,
identified debris. Commercial operators cannot resolve the debris problem because they cannot control outer space, the space
objects of other operators, the vast amount of small but dangerous space debris, or remove debris from outer space without authority from the owners of debris.75 Resolution of the debris
problem requires active international and national government
regulation at multiple levels. One space power (such as the
U.S.) authorizing commercial satellite operations can reduce
the danger or amount of space debris through mitigation or incentives for their operators. However, controlling space debris
of unknown origin and debris caused by operators authorized
by other governments requires expedited international coordination in UNCOPUOS.
C.

TRACKING TRAFFIC

IN

SPACE

Tracking space objects is currently the most basic form of
space traffic control and is essential for space commerce operational safety.76 Tracking identifies prospective “conjunctions”
(close approaches) of space objects in orbit.77 The DOD is the
72 The 2019 ODMSP places quantitative limits on the amount of debris that
may be released during operations, establishes preferred disposal methods for
space objects in LEO and different methods for disposal in GEO, and establishes
special deorbit operating practices for large constellation and other classes of
operations. See NASA, U.S. GOVERNMENT ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD
PRACTICES, NOVEMBER 2019 UPDATE 1 (2019), https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/
library/usg_orbital_debris_mitigation_standard_practices_november_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZ52-97FY].
73 Id.
74 See Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,422,
52,444 (Aug. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 5, 25, and 97); cf. Liability
Convention, supra note 1.
75 See Space Debris: The Legal Issues, ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOC’Y, https://
www.aerosociety.com/news/space-debris-the-legal-issues/ [https://perma.cc/
HM9R-H2NC] (“Another State, or the private entity of another State, may not
touch, interfere with or remove a space object without the launching State’s
consent.”).
76 E.g., Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 10, § 5(a)(ii).
77 Peterson et al., supra note 40, at 3.
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most extensive tracker of space objects,78 whereas the ESA and
several other countries conduct less sophisticated tracking.79
Both U.S. and foreign space commerce depend on DOD tracking services.80 The U.S. Air Force CSpOC tracks about 23,000
large objects in outer space81 and makes tracking information
available to civilian operators.82
Comprehensive civilian STM will require extensive traffic data
sharing; it will need to monitor national traffic and space traffic
originating in other countries.83 Such international sharing of
traffic data will require traffic control observatories with data
bank facilities.84 It will also require radar observation and a traffic control organization to process the data.85 Furthermore, the
management and control of space commerce traffic will require
civilian government functions rather than the for-profit arrangement used by commercial traffic data collection and sharing entities.86 As stated by the Aerospace Center for Space Policy and
Strategy, “[w]ithout a process for rapidly incorporating and disseminating STM service data, it will not be possible to maintain
safe space operations in the dynamic environment of the near
future.”87 Established civilian space traffic control must draw
traffic data from all possible sources such as the military, nongovernmental, and commercial sectors. Thus, incorporating priSee Garber & Herron, supra note 50.
See id.
80 See id.; see also Tracking Space Debris Is a Growing Business, supra note 61.
81 Garber & Herron, supra note 50.
82 Id. The U.S. Air Force maintains a website, space-track.org, for exchange of
satellite maneuvers. See NASA AGREEMENT WITH SPACEX, supra note 11, art. 2.
83 See Garber & Herron, supra note 50 (listing the various organizations around
the world that provide SSA information with different coverage).
84 See SPACE AGENDA 2021, supra note 38, at 5. For example, LeoLabs, a firm in
Silicon Valley, now operates several tracking satellites and sells tracking information, including to private satellite operators. See Tracking Space Debris Is a Growing
Business, supra note 61.
85 See SPACE AGENDA 2021, supra note 38, at 5.
86 Id.; see also Garber & Herron, supra note 50.
87 SPACE AGENDA 2021, supra note 38, at 5. The U.S. Air Force’s tracking capability is improving; the technology is being upgraded so that the Air Force will be
able to track close to ten times more objects. See Mike Gruss, Good (Space) Fences
Make for Good (Orbital) Neighbors, SPACENEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), https://
spacenews.com/good-space-fences-make-for-good-orbital-neighbors/ [https://
perma.cc/5MSE-3P84]; see also Sandra Erwin, Space Fence Surveillance Radar Site
Declared Operational, SPACENEWS (Mar. 28, 2020), https://spacenews.com/spacefence-surveillance-radar-site-declared-operational/ [https://perma.cc/6Q926NSC].
78
79
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vate data collection into the data banks will be an important
task.88
D. PRIORITY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION
The foundation for commercial use of outer space is the exploration of the universe.89 The preamble to the OST clarifies
that the authors’ primary objective was to explore outer space,
with commercial use being their secondary objective.90 In Article I of the OST, the states agreed that “[t]here shall be freedom
of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.”91 By
that plain language, the states expressed their intention to make
astronomical explorations and improve their understanding of
the universe. Consequently, all uses of outer space must allow
for continued exploration of outer space.
Astronomers’ and scientists’ needs must be taken into consideration in regulating other outer space activities. Ground
telescopes must have unhindered views of outer space to capture proper images.92 Astronomers have complained that the
lights of large commercial satellite constellations disturb their
88 See Garber & Herron, supra note 50; see also Tracking Space Debris Is a Growing
Business, supra note 61 (summarizing several sources of commercial tracking of
satellites and debris).
89 See Commercial Opportunities for Space Exploration, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://
www.esa.int/About_Us/Business_with_ESA/Business_Opportunities/Commercial_Opportunities_for_Space_Exploration [https://perma.cc/XLC7-5W5F]
(“Commercial partnership plays a growing role in the exciting ESA vision for
space exploration.”). See generally Larsen, supra note 19, at 13–15 (discussing multiple reasons why scientists’ and astronomers’ continuing role in space exploration is important).
90 See OST, supra note 1, pmbl.
91 Id. art. I; see IISL Statement, supra note 2.
92 See Alexandra Witze, How Satellite ‘Megaconstellations’ Will Photobomb Astronomy
Images, NATURE (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-02002480-5 [https://perma.cc/C8PR-FJKZ].
Communicating with distant spacecraft is difficult. The signals that
pass between the spacecraft and ground stations are very weak and
because of the large distances, it takes them a long time to travel
between the two. It can take up to 24 minutes for a signal to travel
between Earth and Mars, for example, and almost an entire day to
receive a signal sent by NASA’s Voyager 1—a spacecraft that has
travelled beyond the edge of the Solar System.
Deep Space Communication and Navigation, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://
www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Discovery_and_Preparation/Deep_space_communication_and_navigation [https://
perma.cc/66RS-TCKM].
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view of outer space.93 A recent study published by the U.K. Royal
Astronomical Society94 states that the recent orbits of mega constellations—such as the SpaceX deployment of more than a
thousand satellites for Internet access—has increased the brightness of the night sky by 10% over its natural level, thus presenting a significant threat to astronomy.95 The brightness increase
affects 40% of ultra-wide imaging exposures.96 The reflectivity of
satellites varies; some satellites are highly reflective due to thermal management, whereas others absorb heat and are less reflective.97 The effect of radiance will quickly increase as
thousands more satellites are put into orbit.98 In the past, astronomers tended to build observatories in remote places such as
Chile and Australia99 to escape the interfering city lights. But the
light effect of mega-constellations in outer space cannot be
avoided;100 it affects all ground-based observatories regardless of
where they are located.101
93 Witze, supra note 92; cf. Jeff Foust, Can Satellite Megaconstellations Be Responsible Users of Space?, SPACENEWS (Sept. 3, 2019), https://spacenews.com/can-satellite-megaconstellations-be-responsible-users-of-space/ [https://perma.cc/RLN6C82A] (reporting the different ways commercial satellite companies are trying to
address sustainability concerns). The President of the American Astronautical Society has expressed concerns about SpaceX small satellite constellations blocking
astronomical observations. Id.
94 Miroslav Kocifaj, Frantisek Kundracik, John C. Berentine & Salva Bará, The
Proliferation of Space Objects Is a Rapidly Increasing Source of Artificial Night Sky Brightness, 504 MONTHLY NOTICES ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOC’Y L40 (2021).
95 Id. at L43. The natural level of brightness is the critical “red-line” standard
established by the International Astronomical Union for earth-based astronomical observation. Id.
96 Id. at L40.
97 See id. at L42.
98 See id. at L44.
99 See
Controlling Light Pollution, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL UNION, https://
www.iau.org/public/themes/light_pollution/ [https://perma.cc/BSW3-CABS].
100 See Alfredo Carpineti, Artificial Space Objects Are Bringing Light Pollution to
Most of the Planet, IFLSCI. (Mar. 30, 2021, 1:57 PM), https://www.iflscience.com/
space/artificial-space-objects-are-bringing-light-pollution-to-most-of-the-planet/
[https://perma.cc/WC4J-CYR3].
101 See id.; U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., DARK AND QUIET SKIES FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 68 (2021), https://
www.iau.org/static/publications/dqskies-book-29-12-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CJ38-ZB55]. The feedback received after the “Dark and Quiet Skies Conferences
for Science and Society” are scheduled to be presented to COPUOS meetings in
February of 2022. See Dark and Quiet Skies: An Opportunity to Make Your Voice Heard
Around the World, INT’L DARK-SKY ASS’N (Aug. 12, 2021), https://
www.darksky.org/dark-and-quiet-skies-an-opportunity-to-make-your-voice-heardaround-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/Y5XN-3VK2].
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Many conditions and situations on Earth can only be observed
from telescopes in outer space. A clear view of the Earth from
outer space is important for scientists to observe and measure
occurrences like climate conditions that are otherwise undetectable.102 The rising climate change concern requires monitoring
to comply with the Paris Agreement and U.S. climate change
policy.103 Projects related to climate change, like renewable energy, can overlap with outer space activities. For instance, the
U.S. Department of Energy has done extensive research on deploying solar-powered satellites into orbit to collect solar energy
and channel the solar energy via microwaves down to footprints
on Earth.104 Thus, U.S. national policies on climate change and
renewable sources of energy must be weighed in policy decisions
regarding space commerce.
Astronomers must search the universe for planets suitable for
human habitation as various threats point to the probability that
the Earth will become uninhabitable.105 The Earth has repeatedly been impacted by different-sized asteroids and will be
struck again at some unknown time in the future.106 NASA actively looks for asteroids and identifies the largest ones with the
hope of avoiding major collisions.107 Nevertheless, the Earth
continues to be impacted by small, unanticipated asteroid
strikes.108
Astronomers voice their interests and act primarily through
their governments and organizations, such as the International
Astronomical Union, the Committee on Space Research, and
102 See, e.g., J.R. Elliot, R.J. Walters & T.J. Wright, The Role of Space-Based Observation in Understanding and Responding to Active Tectonics and Earthquakes, 7 NATURE
COMMC’NS (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms13844.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44FQ-9V5F].
103 Paul B. Larsen, Climate Change Management in the Space Age, 45 WM. & MARY
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 110 (2020).
104 FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 269–70 (1st ed.
2009); see also CARL Q. CHRISTOL, PRC ENERGY ANALYSIS CO., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SATELLITE POWER SYSTEMS (SPS) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 123 (1978).
105 Threats include climate change, asteroid strikes, or other catastrophes. See,
e.g., Casey Dreier, Why an Asteroid Strike Is like a Pandemic, SCI. AM. (July 25, 2021),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-an-asteroid-strike-is-like-a-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/5XGR-43B8] (stating that astronomers use telescopes
to watch for potentially destructive asteroids).
106 See id.
107 Id.;
see also Planetary Defense Coordination Office, NASA, https://
www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/overview/ [https://perma.cc/N9TA-6DUS]
(Mar. 14, 2019).
108 Dreier, supra note 105.
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the International Astronautical Federation.109 Astronomers coordinate findings and recommendations through the UNCOPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.110
Astronomers and scientists also rely on their governments to
protect and assert their rights to explore outer space under the
Outer Space Treaty.111
E.

TENSION BETWEEN SPACE COMMERCE
PROTECTION

AND

ENVIRONMENTAL

The current environmental impact assessment for outer space
use is not effective. It is recognized that the quality of life and
the health of present and future generations of human beings
requires environmental protection and that the outer space environment is living space.112 In recent years, a “general international duty towards the preservation and conservation of the
environment . . . is developing.”113 However, in the U.S., formal
environmental impact statements by reviewing agencies (which
are required for activities on Earth) are not required for launch
approval of commercial activities in outer space.114 For an effective environmental assessment for outer space, it will need to be
implemented domestically by all agencies with related interests:
109 See
generally About the IAU, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL UNION, https://
www.iau.org/administration/about/ [https://perma.cc/33WS-94AP]; COSPAR
Charter, COMM. ON SPACE RSCH., https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/about/charter/
[https://perma.cc/V47V-FQ8F] (Apr. 19, 2019); History and Missions, INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL FED’N, https://www.iafastro.org/about/history-and-missions.html
[https://perma.cc/K3TU-8572].
110 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sci. & Tech. Subcomm.,
Recommendations to Keep Dark and Quiet Skies for Science and Society, ¶¶ 1,
20, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2021/CRP.17 (Apr. 19, 2021) (workshop and conference to discuss astronomy community’s concerns).
111 Id. ¶¶ 20, 64.
112 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8) (noting States’ responsibility for activities in its control to respect the environment because it is an interconnected living space).
Note that preservation of outer space for future generations is one of the objectives of the UNCOPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer
Space Activities. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for the
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, ¶¶ 5–6, 8, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/L.318/Add.4 (June 19, 2019).
113 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 248–49; see also LTS Guidelines, supra note
38, ¶¶ 10, 20; IISL Statement, supra note 2. See generally ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE
ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 5.
114 See L.E. Viikari, Environmental Impact Assessment and Space Activities, 34 ADVANCES SPACE RSCH. 2363, 2364 (2004).
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NASA, the FAA, the FCC,115 NOAA, and the DOD. Currently, an
interagency working group is chaired by the DOC.116
On the international level, implementing the 2007 Space
Debris Guidelines by the U.S. and the other space powers was a
start. Improved international guidelines are being developed in
UNCOPUOS,117 which means commercial operators will eventually adjust to environmental requirements. The pressing question is whether that can happen quickly enough to preclude a
major collision disaster.
Undoubtedly, Earth and outer space require more protection
from space debris. The outer space environment suffers from
the increasing traffic of satellites and related space debris.118 But
space debris is not only a problem in outer space because more
and more space debris is falling on the Earth.119 One recent example was the uncontrolled debris of a Chinese booster rocket
that landed near the Maldives in the Indian Ocean.120 Another
example is the SpaceX debris that crashed in the state of Washington and other areas.121 Falling debris is also an issue during
launches when debris from rockets land on property adjoining
launch pads.122
The environmental risks raise the question of who should be
considering environmental side effects when authorizing space
launches. The current environmental situation of outer space
See Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age: Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, F.C.C. 20-54 ¶ 20 (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-54A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BF7M-4RNJ] [hereinafter 2020 FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Mitigation of Orbital Debris].
116 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 55.
117 Recommendations to Keep Dark and Quiet Skies for Science and Society,
supra note 110.
118 E.g., SPACE AGENDA 2021, supra note 38, at 3.
119 See, e.g., Myers & Chang, supra note 58 (covering uncontrolled re-entries of
rockets or booster stages of rockets).
120 Id.
121 Id.; Antonia Noori Farzan, From a Texas Dental Office to the Canadian Tundra,
Here’s Where Space Debris Has Crashed to Earth, WASH. POST (May 25, 2021, 12:02
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/from-a-texas-dental-office-tothe-canadian-tundra-heres-where-space-debris-has-crashed-to-earth/2021/05/21/
bb1bf46e-b992-11eb-96b9-e949d5397de9_story.html [https://perma.cc/NU9LA2LW].
122 Evidently, the noise and debris from a new SpaceX launch facility in Texas
was not considered adequately by the FAA when it authorized its operation. See
Edgar Sandoval & Richard Webner, A Serene Shore Resort, Except for the SpaceX ‘Ball
of Fire’, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/24/us/space-x-bocachica-texas.html [https://perma.cc/6CTX-97RD] (May 26, 2021).
115

552

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[86

requires governmental regulation as well as bottom-up coordination.123 So far, environmental consequences tend to be
weighed inadequately by authorizing governmental authorities.
In the case of the Chinese rocket debris crash into the Indian
Ocean, it is the responsibility of the Chinese government to assure environmental protection from its space debris anywhere
around the world.124 Yet, some in the space industry criticized
the Chinese government’s recklessness in handling the mission
and crash.125 In the U.S., the FAA considers the environmental
consequences for commercial launches.126 Still, some may suggest that the Environmental Protection Agency should have a
role in protecting the environmental quality of outer space. For
example, should launch licensing (currently handled by the
FAA) include an environmental impact assessment that aims to
prevent further space debris accumulation in outer space?
F.

SHOULD PROMOTION

OF COMMERCIAL SPACE BE LEFT
INDUSTRY?

TO

Many space trade associations have been formed to promote
commercial space by providing joint industry contributions to
safety, environment, and business regulations.127 The associations tend to state their purpose is to promote best practices
among individual members of the industry.128 The associations
represent a variety of stakeholders.129 The Space Data Association, for example, is an international association of large, established organizations such as Eutelsat, Inmarsat, Intelsat, and
SES.130 Government agencies such as NASA, DLR (Germany),
See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 16; IISL Statement, supra note 2.
China is liable for damage caused. See Liability Convention, supra note 1,
art. II.
125 See Meyers & Chang, supra note 58.
126 See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
SPACEX FALCON LAUNCHES AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER AND CAPE CANAVERAL AIR
FORCE STATION 1 (2020), https://www.faa.gov/space/environmental/
nepa_docs/media/SpaceX_Falcon_Program_Draft_EA_508.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T2L5-Q9VF].
127 Larsen, supra note 37, at 765–67.
128 See, e.g., Space Debris, Mitigation & Sustainability, SATELLITE INDUS. ASS’N,
https://sia.org/policy/space-debris-mitigation-sustainability/ [https://
perma.cc/ZMK8-85L2]; Welcome to the Space Data Association, SPACE DATA ASS’N,
https://www.space-data.org/sda/ [https://perma.cc/6CZ4-K8HS].
129 See Garber & Herron, supra note 50.
130 Participants, SPACE DATA ASS’N, https://www.space-data.org/sda/participants/ [https://perma.cc/P9PF-3JGP].
123
124
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and NOAA are also members.131 The Space Data Association distributes data from the Air Force CSpOC and other sources to its
subscribing members.132 The Commercial Smallsat Spectrum
Management Association includes small satellite operators sharing and representing their members’ issues.133 The Consortium
for Execution of Rendezvous and Sensing Operations seeks to
establish voluntary industry norms for servicing satellites in their
orbits.134 The Space Safety Coalition includes space companies
and government entities seeking to promote operational safety
and avoid collisions.135 Promotion of the entire commercial
space industry would consist of national and foreign businesses,
which is what the DOC intends to do.136 Even though there are
numerous associations, none of them represent the entire space
commerce industry. Thus, space commerce is divided into many
different interests, does not speak with one voice, and cannot
manage a crisis that ultimately involves all outer space
stakeholders.137
III.

THE LAW APPLICABLE TO COMMERCIAL SPACE

Outer space is inherently international because of its non-sovereign character. The OST is a government-to-government
agreement.138 Non-government entities are permitted to participate in space activities, but their governments are essentially still
responsible for their actions.139 Thus, the national governments
are liable for the activities of their commercial operators.140 This
Id.
See Garber & Herron, supra note 50.
133 See Smallsat Industry Leaders, COMMERCIAL SMALLSAT SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION, https://cssma.space/ [https://perma.cc/9LCV-H9MV].
134 About, CONSORTIUM FOR EXECUTION OF RENDEZVOUS & SERVICING OPERATIONS, https://www.satelliteconfers.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/9MHTUVUS].
135 SPACE SAFETY COAL., https://spacesafety.org/ [https://perma.cc/WM3EQ58D]. The Space Safety Coalition publishes Best Practices for the Sustainability of
Space Operations. See Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations, SPACE
SAFETY COAL. (Sept. 16, 2019), https://spacesafety.org/wp-content/uploads/
2021/04/Endorsement-of-Best-Practices-for-Sustainability_v40.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MP5G-DW7N].
136 See 51 U.S.C. § 50702(d)(2), (6).
137 See generally Larsen, supra note 37, at 765–67 (examples of different commercial groups’ preferences of regulations and regulatory authorities). There is
currently no agreement among satellite operators on STM to avoid collisions. See
Foust, supra note 9.
138 See OST, supra note 1, art. XIII.
139 See id. art. VI.
140 Id. arts. VI–VII.
131
132
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nationally assumed risk is huge and is increasing with every new
space commerce activity. On the other hand, the risk assumption is also an incentive for the authorizing governments to assure commercial operators’ compliance with strict safety
standards.141
The OST establishes the order governing exploration and
uses of outer space.142 The OST evidences the 1967 parity between the U.S. and Russia, which were the only two space powers at the time.143 The non-space powers readily accepted this
arrangement in the 1967 OST144 because it gave them time to
recover economically after World War II. Based on the OST,
states also entered into the Agreement on Rescue and Return of
Astronauts, the Liability Convention, and Registration Convention.145 Additionally, as of July 2019, eighteen (mostly developing) states are parties to the 1979 Moon Agreement.146
Furthermore, the states in a separate treaty obligation belong to
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).147 Article
44 of the ITU Constitution provides that “radio frequencies and
any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit,
are limited natural resources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently and economically.”148
The state parties’ obligation to the OST indirectly subjected
non-governmental space enterprises to the space treaties.149 After the adoption of the treaties, commercial space became increasingly active and now constitutes most of the activities in
space.150 This Section aims to show that their respective govern141 See id.; Liability Convention, supra note 1, arts. II–III; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 2, at 96–97; IISL Statement, supra note 2.
142 See OST, supra note 1, art. I.
143 E.g., LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 52.
144 See id. at 52.
145 Id. at 75.
146 Louis de Gouyon Matignon, The 1979 Moon Agreement, SPACE LEGAL ISSUES
(July 17, 2019), https://www.spacelegalissues.com/the-1979-moon-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/P3VW-VH4E].
147 See Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22,
1992, T.I.A.S. No. 97-1026, 1825 U.N.T.S. 330 [hereinafter ITU Constitution].
148 Id. art. 44(2).
149 OST, supra note 1, art. VI; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 414. As
mentioned previously, that decision came almost as an afterthought because the
states at that time evidently expected that most outer space activities would be
conducted by states.
150 Tina Highfall, Patrick Georgi & Dominique Dubria, Measuring the Value of
the U.S. Space Economy, 99 SURV. CURRENT BUS., Dec. 2019, at 1, 4 (The Space
Foundation had “reported global space activity . . . with commercial space reve-
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ments’ treaty obligations form the legal basis for commercial
space and that commercial space activities place heavy duties on
their states.
A.

INTERNATIONAL “HARD LAW”: THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
ARTICLE VI ESTABLISHES GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND
CONTINUING OVERSIGHT OVER COMMERCIAL
SPACE

Article VI of the OST places international responsibility on
each state party to ensure treaty compliance by authorized governmental and non-governmental entities.151 Each government
administers its treaty responsibilities by conditioning its permission to non-governmental operators on their compliance with
the OST and other legal obligations.152 This is usually done by
national laws and regulations or directly imposing the treaty obligations on authorized non-governmental operators.153 The
most effective way to enforce the treaty obligations would be to
implement them through national licensing laws that express
those obligations.154 Furthermore, the authorizing governments
must continue to monitor and supervise their authorized private
operators to ensure they stay within the scope of their government-granted permission.155
B.

U.S. “HARD LAWS” REGULATE USE OF OUTER SPACE
COMMERCIAL ENTITIES

BY

National states have adopted varying laws and regulations on
the use of outer space. In the U.S., the U.S. Commercial Space
Launch Act authorizes commercial launches and reentries from
outer space subject to the U.S’s safety, public health, and national security interests.156 The U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act authorizes U.S. citizens engaged in commercial recovery of space resources to own and sell any space
nues representing 79 percent of total space activity.”); see also LYALL & LARSEN,
supra note 2, at 416.
151 See OST, supra note 1, art. VI.
152 But see 2020 FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Mitigation of Orbital
Debris, supra note 115, ¶¶ 135–139 (requesting further comments on alternatives
to alleviate weight of liability on the U.S. government).
153 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 416.
154 See id. Licensing laws would answer IISL’s call for authorities to consider
“whether there are adequate mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with the
[OST].” IISL Statement, supra note 2.
155 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 416.
156 Commercial Space Launch Act § 2(7), 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7).
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resource obtained.157 All of these laws are specifically made subject to the terms of the OST to avoid any conflict.158
Article II of the OST provides that neither states nor their
authorized non-governmental operators may appropriate outer
space—including the Moon and celestial bodies—by use, occupation, or any means whatsoever.159 In other words, “the states
cannot authorise non-governmental entities to appropriate
outer space celestial bodies. The states cannot grant any rights
which they themselves do not possess.”160 Accordingly, the ITU
recognizes that commercial space operators cannot own frequencies and associated orbits.161 They can only receive permission to use frequencies and associated orbits, which is subject to
forfeiture if they violate the terms of their permission.162 Applying the same principle most broadly, Article I of the OST grants
the right to use outer space on the conditions that it: (1) be “for
the benefit” of all countries; (2) be “in the interests of all countries”; (3) be recognized as “the province of all mankind”; (4) be
explored and used “by all States without discrimination of any
kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international
law”; and (5) offer “free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”163
Thus, there are issues with the U.S. Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act’s legitimacy. First, it is contrary to
Article II of the OST and its prohibition on the appropriation of
celestial bodies.164 Second, the other eighteen states who are
parties to the 1979 Moon Treaty challenge the grant of ownership by the Act. Article 11 of the Moon Treaty states that the
Moon “is the common heritage of mankind,” subject to international regulation that is yet to be established.165 As commercial
activities begin to lean towards individual-centric goals rather
than established global values, the OST and other international
157 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act § 402(a), 51 U.S.C.
§ 51303.
158 Cf. Paul B. Larsen, Is There a Legal Path to Commercial Mining on the Moon?,
PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
159 OST, supra note 1, art. II.
160 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 416 & n.24 (expressing the ancient Roman
legal maxim nihil dat qui non habet (no one can give what they do not have)).
161 See ITU Constitution, supra note 147, art. 44(2).
162 See id. arts. 6, 39.
163 OST, supra note 1, art. I.
164 Id. art. II (“Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”).
165 1979 Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11(1), (5).
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agreements should be the ruler to measure a proposed regulation’s or legislation’s compatibility with the international policy
and scheme.
C.
1.

INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW-MAKING ORGANIZATIONS

UNCOPUOS

UNCOPUOS is the international forum for discussion and
resolution of outer space issues,166 other than military issues.167
UNCOPUOS operates by a consensus and represents all the
space powers and developing countries.168 The existing five
space law treaties were all negotiated in UNCOPUOS.169 After
the conclusion of the last treaty, the 1979 Moon Agreement,
UNCOPUOS focused on adopting soft law instruments—most
of which were adopted as U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.170
In 2015, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 70/1 adopted seventeen broad goals leading to sustainable economic, social, and
environmental world development.171 To implement the U.N.
resolution, UNCOPUOS adopted the LTS Guidelines, which
contain many provisions that improve outer space safety of commercial space operations as described below.172
166 See
COPUOS History, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS. https://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/history.html [https://perma.cc/
UFC3-N8ZA].
167 Military issues are discussed in the U.N. Disarmament Commission in Geneva. See Rep. of the Disarmament Comm’n: Review of the Implementation of
the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its
Tenth Special Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/182/Rev.1, at 53 (June 9, 1999) (Guidelines and Recommendations for Objective Information on Military Matters);
United Nations Disarmament Commission, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., https:/
/www.un.org/disarmament/institutions/disarmament-commission/ [https://
perma.cc/E5J9-5JWY].
168 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 14–18. UNCOPUOS is supported by
the UNOOSA, which supports the Committee and its legal and technical subcommittees, administers the space law treaties, maintains the registry of space law
objects, and administers the Disaster Charter as well as UN-SPIDER. See Roles and
Responsibilities, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/
en/aboutus/roles-responsibilities.html [https://perma.cc/4ZC8-CWHU].
169 See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE
AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html [https://
perma.cc/MBS7-RRX6]; sources cited supra note 1 (list of the five treaties).
170 See, e.g., UNCOPUOS Adoption, supra note 33, ¶ 11 (referring to U.N.
GAOR, 75th Sess. Supplement 20, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/75/20 (Oct. 12, 2020)).
171 G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶ 18 (Sept. 25, 2015).
172 See Peter Martinez, UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities: Early Implementation Experiences and Next Steps in COPUOS, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 71ST INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS (IAC) – THE
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Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of Space Relating
to Space Traffic Management

The LTS Guidelines are currently the only internationally
agreed guidelines for establishing long-term economic stability
and order in the outer space marketplace.173 They build on the
existing international legal framework, particularly the OST.174
All the space powers—the U.S., China, Russia—and the developing nations adopted the LTS Guidelines by consensus.175 Therefore, the LTS Guidelines represent the consequences of New
Space. They represent a shared understanding by all parties.
They are voluntary guidelines, but all states agreed to adopt
them as national rules to the extent feasible and practicable.176
When they are adopted and enforced by individual states, the
LTS Guidelines will make outer space more economically secure
for space commerce and improve safety, for example, through
safe STM.177 Moreover, the LTS Guidelines are forward-looking
and allow for updates as New Space develops. The following LTS
Guidelines provisions relate to commercial space. They provide
that the states will:
1. maintain regulatory guidelines to improve the long-term sustainability of commercial space safety, reliability, liability, and related cost;178
2. adopt and enforce U.N. space debris mitigation guidelines,
minimize environmental impact of human activities, minimize
cost of compliance with government regulations, and seek input
from advisory groups;179
3. enable and supervise compliance by commercial space activities with LTS Guidelines, establish uniform safety and reliability
CYBERSPACE EDITION, 12-14 OCTOBER 2020 (2020), https://swfound.org/media/
207080/iac2020_e341_lts_guidelines_early_implementation_experiences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UWA-GC84].
173 LTS Guidelines, supra note 38. Note strong endorsement of the LTS Guidelines by the European Space Traffic Management Conference July 2021. European
STM Report, supra note 3, at 3.
174 See LTS Guidelines, supra note 38, at 3.
175 In 2019, the U.S. and all the other members of the Committee for Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space agreed on the existing LTS Guidelines. See Foust, supra note
32.
176 LTS Guidelines, supra note 38, at 4.
177 UNCOPUOS Adoption, supra note 33, ¶ 12; SPACE AGENDA 2021, supra note
38, at 2.
178 See LTS Guidelines, supra note 38, at 9–10 (Guideline A.1).
179 See id. at 10–11 (Guideline A.2).
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procedures, promote long-term sustainability of space, and encourage data sharing by commercial entities.180
4. allocate radiofrequencies and related orbits to commercial
space equitably, rationally, and efficiently as required by ITU
Constitution Articles 44 and 45181 and ensure removal of defunct
commercial space objects from orbits;
5. arrange space object registration of commercial space objects prior to launch as required by the Registration Convention
and by U.N. General Assembly resolutions 1721 B (XVI) and 62/
101, including eventual removal of commercial space objects at
the end of service;182
6. monitor space traffic and exchange space safety-related data
with other governments and the UNOOSA183 regarding governmental as well as non-governmental space traffic and make assessments of collision dangers, consequent loss of life, damages, and
environmental deterioration;184
7. perfect and promote the accuracy of satellite tracking and
sensing techniques and the distribution of collected data using
uniform standards;185
8. perfect and promote space debris tracking and the distribution of collected data using uniform standards;186
9. evaluate and continually assess, as part of the governmental
authorization process required by Article VI of the OST, the collision dangers of all maneuverable space objects;187
10. encourage the assessment of collision dangers before authorizing launches as well as collect and exchange related information about collision dangers using uniform standards;188
11. collect and promote the collection of weather information
and its impact on space activities, and adopt government policies
supporting space weather forecasting;189
12. establish practices for collection, reporting, and researching weather information, and encourage satellite operators to
participate;190
See id. at 11–13 (Guideline A.3).
See id. at 13–14 (Guideline A.4); see also ITU Constitution, supra note 147,
arts. 44–45.
182 See LTS Guidelines, supra note 38, at 14–16 (Guideline A.5).
183 See id. at 19–20. The LTS Guidelines recommend establishment of a
databank in UNOOSA. See id.
184 See id. (Guideline B.1).
185 See id. at 20–21 (Guideline B.2).
186 See id. at 21 (Guideline B.3).
187 See id. at 21–22 (Guideline B.4).
188 See id. at 22–23 (Guideline B.5).
189 See id. at 23–25 (Guideline B.6).
190 See id. at 25–26 (Guideline B.7).
180
181
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13. promote the design of space objects—particularly small
space objects—so that they can easily be tracked and avoided;191
14. adopt procedures for managing the uncontrolled reentry of
space objects, share information, and provide assistance before,
during, and after such events;192
15. adopt precautions to avoid damaging space objects when
sending laser beams through outer space;193
16. include the private sector in their promotion of international cooperation and capacity building;194
17. include non-governmental entities that will share their experiences with developing countries in maintaining long-term
sustainability of outer space activities;195
18. include education, training, sharing of information and
technology, and disaster management in capacity building of
commercial space;196
19. include commercial space operators in outreach to developing countries to give educational seminars, distribute guidelines,
and explain available services and regulations, including space
debris mitigation, complying with ITU rules on harmful interference, and avoiding environmental damages;197
20. encourage commercial space to conduct business in support of sustainable scientific and technical research on outer
space;198 and
21. encourage commercial space to prevent collisions in outer
space and to consider new ways of controlling and mitigating
space debris in the long term.199

b.

Evaluation of Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of
Space Relating to Space Traffic Management

Stability generally encourages investments.200 Hence, space
commerce would benefit from stable, long-term economic conditions created by a safe operational environment uninterSee id. at 27 (Guideline B.8).
See id. at 27–29 (Guideline B.9).
193 See id. at 29 (Guideline B.10).
194 See id. at 31 (Guideline C.1).
195 See id. (Guideline C.2).
196 See id. at 32 (Guideline C.3); see also Paul B. Larsen, The Oso Landslide: Disaster Management Law in the Space Age, 40 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 335,
356–57 (2016) (providing that the Sendai conference participants can assist
States in disaster risk reduction).
197 See LTS Guidelines, supra note 38, at 33–34 (Guideline C.4).
198 See id. at 37 (Guideline D.1).
199 See id. at 38 (Guideline D.2).
200 See How the IMF Promotes Global Economic Stability, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/
191
192
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rupted by collisions. Long-term economic stability is an objective
that all stakeholders can agree on. The European Space Traffic
Management Conference agreed that:
Europe should work on the implementation of the existing voluntary LTS guidelines adopted by UNCOPUOS and could develop standards and good practices; this development would be
gradual and incremental and should be based on the principle of
reciprocity, so as not to penalize the competitiveness of the European space industry, and taking into account strategic issues as
well.201

The LTS Guidelines are intended to implement and supplement the existing international legal framework established by
the OST and other space law treaties and guidelines, such as the
2007 Space Debris Guidelines.202 The LTS Guidelines include:
(1) safety rules for authorizing commercial operations; (2) use
of radio frequencies; (3) safety standards for outer space operations; (4) shared information about space debris; (5) assessment
of collision risks; (6) shared weather information; (7) tracking
of space objects; (8) information about possible uncontrolled
reentry of defunct satellites; (9) cautions about possible laser
beams disturbing satellite orbit; (10) provisions for education
and assistance to developing states (capacity building); and (11)
support for scientific research and development. The U.S.
joined in the consensus to implement the voluntary LTS Guidelines to the extent practicable and feasible.203 The U.S. should
regularly refer to these in its administrative and legislative
actions.
D.

CURRENT U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE REGULATIONS RELATING
TO SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: SOFT LAW

Article VI of the OST includes non-governmental entities
among the possible authorized users of non-sovereign outer
27/15/22/How-the-IMF-Promotes-Global-Economic-Stability [https://perma.cc/
WY49-AKB6].
201 See European STM Report, supra note 3, at 3.
202 See LTS Guidelines, supra note 38, at 10 (Guideline A.2).
203 See, e.g., Nicole Shampaine, Deputy Chief, U.S. Mission to Int’l Orgs. in
Vienna, National Statement at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space 56th STSC (Feb. 11, 2019), https://vienna.usmission.gov/national-statement-at-the-committee-on-the-peaceful-uses-of-outer-space-56th-scientific-andtechnical-subcommittee/ [https://perma.cc/8YVM-7THS] (“The United States
hopes that States can begin voluntarily implementing [the LTS Guidelines] to
the greatest extent practicable, consistent with their respective needs, conditions,
and capabilities”).
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space.204 When the U.S. permits non-governmental entities to
do business in non-sovereign space, it agrees to make non-governmental entities subject to international space law provisions
and continually supervise their compliance with the OST.205
1.

Department of Transportation

As commercial space activities became significant in outer
space in the 1970s and 1980s,206 Congress adopted the 1984
Commercial Space Launch Act to administer commercial space
access and supervise commercial space activities.207 The Act gave
the Department of Transportation (DOT) authority to license
commercial launches subject to the OST terms and supervise
their activities for actual compliance.208 However, under
51 U.S.C. § 50901, the DOT legal authority is limited to:
“[O]versee[ing] and coordinat[ing] the conduct of commercial
launch and reentry operations, issu[ing] permits and commercial licenses and transfer[ing] commercial licenses authorizing
those operations, and protect[ing] the public health and safety,
safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.”209
The Act also authorized the DOT with inspection and approval of payloads,210 implementation of the OST,211 promotion
of safety in outer space,212 and advancement of space commerce.213 The DOT eventually redelegated its functions under
the Commercial Space Launch Act to the FAA.214 Safety adminOST, supra note 1, art. VI.
See id.
206 See generally Origins of the Commercial Space Industry, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/milestones/media/commercial_space_industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6HC-HD7E].
207 Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923.
208 See id. § 50901(b)(3).
209 Id.
210 See 14 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2021). Payloads are reviewed to determine range
safety certification, launch manifesting, launch commit criteria development,
predicted tracking, pre-launch coordinates, post-launch early orbit determination, collision avoidance, prelaunch vetting and safety, including predicted conjunctions during launch windows, launches, and initial spacecraft orbit spatial
allocation. See id. § 431.51(a); § 450.43(i); 51 U.S.C. § 50904(b).
211 See 51 U.S.C. § 50919(e)(1).
212 See id. § 50901(b)(3).
213 See id. § 50901(b)(1)–(2).
214 See About the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/ [https://
perma.cc/LUK5-WW7G] (Aug. 10, 2021, 6:06 PM).
204
205
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istration was a natural task for the FAA because it already implemented safety regulations for aviation activities.215 However, the
task of promoting the outer space business was unusual.216
Rapid technological growth, such as the repeated use of space
launch rockets and greater availability of financial resources in
the New Space Age, brought a significant increase in applications for launches.217 The volume of FAA licensing activities has
significantly increased during the New Space Age.218 Whether
the FAA has adequately separated its safety function from its
business promotion functions and whether it has been given the
resources to adequately impact the industry are important given
the trajectory of commercial space.
The Commercial Space Launch Act did not provide the DOT
authority to regulate commercial activities in outer space, such
as mining on the Moon, which is currently an active business
issue.219 The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act provides that:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable
law, including the international obligations of the United
States.220
215 Safety First: Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://
www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/safetyfirst/federal-aviation-administration [https://perma.cc/R5B7-S95Q] (May 2, 2018).
216 Cf. id. (“The FAA regulates and encourages the U.S. commercial space
transportation industry.”). Bilateral and multilateral air service agreements are
administered by a special division in the Office of the DOT Secretary, the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs. See Air Service
Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/international-relations/air-service-agreements [https://perma.cc/
N3UN-Y72N] (Sept. 1, 2017).
217 See Louis de Gouyon Matignon, The History of Reusable Launch Systems, SPACE
LEGAL ISSUES (May 29, 2019), https://www.spacelegalissues.com/the-history-ofreusable-launch-systems/ [https://perma.cc/U8DL-3ME3]; Weinzierl & Sarang,
supra note 35.
218 The FAA Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation reports that FAA licensing activities have increased 1,000% from 2012 to 2020 and
expects this rate of increase to continue. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
219 See Larsen, supra note 158, at 3–4 (stating that the United States’, Europe’s,
and China’s lunar mining efforts include consultation with commercial satellite
operators).
220 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act § 402(a), 51 U.S.C.
§ 51303.
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The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act only authorized ownership.221 It did not grant new licensing authority
to the DOT to cover mining activities, for example. Thus, the
Act did not authorize mining at designated locations on the
Moon.
2.

Department of Commerce

In the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984
and the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,222 Congress
gave the DOC NOAA authority to license and oversee commercial remote sensing activities, subject to the receipt of launch
authority from DOT FAA and use of radio frequencies by the
FCC.223 The DOC is otherwise primarily focused on promoting
business, including commerce.224 Some stakeholders expressed
their concerns with the DOC favoring space business promotion
over safety.225 Under the Trump administration, the DOC became a strong advocate for the commercial space industry
within the government.226 White House policy statements asked
Congress to pass laws authorizing the DOC to regulate STM.227
The NAPA Report strongly supports the White House initiative,
but Congress has not provided adequate funding for STM by the
DOC.228 Moreover, the Biden administration is expanding its reSee id.
Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4201–4292 (repealed 1992); Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163 (codified, as amended, at 51 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.).
223 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (explaining briefly how the Land
Remote-Sensing Policy Act empowered the DOC); MORGAN, supra note 71, at 1,
12.
224 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
225 See id. at 98.
226 See Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 10; Space Policy Directive-3, supra
note 10.
227 See Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 10.
228 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 102; 51 U.S.C. § 50702(a) (establishing
the Office of Space Commerce in the Department of Commerce in law approved
August 6, 2021). Congress is not ready to assign responsibility for STM to the
DOC. See Marcia Smith, Senate Appropriators “Extremely Disappointed” with NOAA’s
Execution of STM Pilot Program, SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM (Oct. 19, 2021, 1:09 AM),
https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/senate-appropriators-extremely-disappointed-with-noaas-execution-of-stm-pilot-program/ [https://perma.cc/3PG825FP]. Congress appropriated funding for a DOC STM pilot program in the Senate Appropriation Bill for 2022, but the bill also expressed that the Committee is
“extremely disappointed” with the execution of the pilot program and recommends improved oversight. See id. The House has not acted yet.
221

222
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view of the NAPA Report, so the U.S. government regulation of
STM remains in flux.229
NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service collects and distributes weather information from
outer space.230 The New Space Age has also brought a significant increase of applications to NOAA.231 The DOC has established an Office of Space Commerce (OSC) within NOAA, with
an objective to promote U.S. space commerce.232 The OSC is
directed “to develop STM technical prototypes, initiate an open
architecture data repository, and perform STM demonstrations
and experiments.”233 However, the OSC has not been moved
from NOAA into the Office of the Secretary of Commerce and
has not been fully funded by Congress as of the time of
writing.234
3.

Federal Communications Commission

The Communications Act establishes the independent FCC
and implements the ITU Treaties.235 The FCC allocates radio
frequencies to commercial satellites in accordance with regulations established under federal law.236 The FCC must also make
findings of public interest and distribute frequencies to quali229 See Scott Pace, NOAA Is Stalling U.S. Space Traffic Management, SPACENEWS
(June 18, 2021), https://spacenews.com/op-ed-noaa-is-stalling-u-s-space-trafficmanagement/ [https://perma.cc/3T67-RC4J]; Sandra Erwin, Lawmakers Ask
Biden Administration to Keep Oversight Committees in the Loop on Space Activities,
SPACENEWS (Mar. 6, 2021), https://spacenews.com/lawmakers-ask-biden-administration-to-keep-oversight-committees-in-the-loop-on-space-activities/ [https://
perma.cc/36MM-QNSG].
230 What
We Do, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://
www.nesdis.noaa.gov/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/D6RQ-C924].
231 Cf. NOAA BLUE BOOK: FY2022, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 75
(2021) (NOAA streamlined its regulations in 2020 to reduce processing timeline
and improve U.S. competitiveness.).
232 See 51 U.S.C. § 50702(a), (c); NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
233 116 CONG. REC. H7930 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2020) (statement of House Appropriations Committee Chairwoman Lowey).
234 See Marcia Smith, Office of Space Commerce Wins Bigger Budget in FY2021, But
Will Remain in NOAA, SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM, https://spacepolicyonline.com/
news/office-of-space-commerce-wins-bigger-budget-in-fy2021-but-will-remain-innoaa/ [https://perma.cc/ABT8-VN5L] (Dec. 22, 2020, 12:13 AM).
235 See Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also id. § 303(n),
(r).
236 See, e.g., id. § 331(a).
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fied applicants accordingly.237 The FCC recently finalized rules
to manage space traffic as well.238
4.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA’s legislative assignment is to engage in civilian government activities239 and only regulates civilian government space
traffic.240 Many of its activities are increasingly subcontracted to
space commerce operators like SpaceX, and NASA exercises influence and control through subcontracting.241 However, NASA
does not regulate space commerce.
5.

Department of Defense
The DOD regulates military space activities.242 It operates the
Global Positioning System that serves both civilian and military
users.243 The U.S. Air Force tracks all large space objects,
whether functional or space debris, and the DOD provides valuable collision warnings to civilian users.244 However, the U.S. Air
Force’s core mission should be to prevent collisions with military
space objects. Tracking objects and warning civilian commercial
space operators of potential conjunctions is costly and beyond
its national security mission. The tracking service provided to
the private sector is not inherently within the scope of the
DOD’s national security functions, except that it serves to avoid
collisions with the increasing number of DOD satellites in
LEO.245
DOD tracking of space objects related to national security
would continue even if civilian space tracking were transferred
to a civilian operator. Funding for space object tracking is part
See id. §§ 301, 307.
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, supra note 74; see also
Paul B. Larsen, Space Traffic Management – The Bin Cheng Model, 44 J. SPACE L. 483,
494–95 (2020).
239 See generally 51 U.S.C. § 20112 (setting out the functions of NASA).
240 See id.; see also NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 94.
241 See, e.g., Christian Davenport, Elon Musk’s SpaceX Wins Contract to Develop
Spacecraft to Land Astronauts on the Moon, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2021, 6:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/16/nasa-lunar-landercontract-spacex/ [https://perma.cc/3DWV-6KVT].
242 See Erwin, supra note 52.
243 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-145, GPS MODERNIZATION: DOD
CONTINUING TO DEVELOP NEW JAM-RESISTANT CAPABILITY, BUT WIDESPREAD USE
REMAINS YEARS AWAY 3 (2021).
244 See sources cited supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
245 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 71–72. Commercial space is sensitive to
the DOD’s fixation on classified tracking. See id. at 4.
237
238
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of and would remain a part of the DOD operating budget provided by Congress.246 However, if the DOD would like to transfer the monitoring of commercial space objects over to a civilian
agency,247 it would have to overcome Congress’s reluctance to
provide funding for an expensive, separate, major civilian tracking service.248 Thus, the DOD remains heavily involved in tracking space objects for the safety of both civilian and military
objects.249 The DOD subcontracts many space activities and influences space commerce through contracting,250 but the DOD
does not regulate space commerce.
6.

Department of State

The Department of State is primarily responsible for administering and enforcing U.S. treaty obligations under the space law
treaties.251 It oversees the registration of non-governmental
satellites into the international registry established by the Registration Convention.252 The State Department also represents the
U.S. in international organizations such as UNCOPUOS,253 but
it does not regulate domestic space commerce.

Id. at 81.
See id. at 3.
248 The Air Force requested additional appropriation for the Space Force,
thereby indicating the renewal of CSpOC rather than the opposite. See Frank
Wolfe, U.S. Space Force Requests $800M Increase in R&D, $456M More for Acquisition,
VIA SATELLITE (June 1, 2021), https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2021/06/01/u-s-space-force-requests-800m-increase-in-rd-456m-more-for-acquisition/ [https://perma.cc/AQD6-P6WY]. The 2021 Consolidated
Appropriations Act appropriated $10 million for the DOC Office of Space Commerce to (1) initiate STM pilot program; (2) develop STM prototypes; (3) initiate open architecture bank; and (4) perform STM demonstrations and
experiments. S. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 116TH CONG., DIVISION B—COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT 41 (Comm.
Print. 2021).
249 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
250 See generally Contracts for Aug. 7, 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://
www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/2305454/ [https://
perma.cc/33QC-39QV].
251 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 25.
252 See id.
253 Id.
246
247
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THE FUTURE: U.S. GOVERNMENT COMMERCIAL
SPACE POLICY
A.

POLICY FORMATION: FIRST STEPS

The rapidly changing environment means that the U.S.
should form a new U.S. policy on safety in outer space. The New
Space Age’s growth of outer space congestion makes all interested stakeholders acutely aware of the increasing danger of collisions.254 A similar safety situation existed in aviation in 1956 at
the time of the Grand Canyon collision between two major passenger airlines.255 It was not until after that catastrophe that better aviation traffic oversight emerged. But why wait for that to
happen in space traffic? At the moment, there is an urgent need
to establish collision avoidance rules and provide traffic oversight for outer space.
Outer space is inherently international because it is non-sovereign. This particular characteristic emphasizes the need for
clear international rules of the road. The OST covers the management of authorized space objects in orbit.256 Soft law international guidelines such as the 2007 Space Debris Guidelines and
the LTS Guidelines are valuable only if (1) they are kept up to
date as traffic increases and (2) states diligently adopt them as
mandatory domestic regulations. Hesitation and delays in adopting international space traffic rules cause individual states—like
the U.S.—and groups of states to prepare diverging regulations
for their space traffic. For example, the ESA is already working
on STM for Europe.257 The other two major space powers,
China and Russia, are increasingly moving toward their versions
See discussion supra Section II.A.
The Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation
Safety Board were established by Congress after the Grand Canyon collision between TWA and United Airlines passenger airplanes in order to update the U.S.’s
“antiquated air traffic control system.” Eileen Bjorkman, The Tragic Mid-Air Plane
Crash That Changed the American Aviation Industry Forever, TIME (Sept. 1, 2020,
12:00 PM), https://time.com/5885096/airplane-collision-history [https://
perma.cc/8ZS8-HQYH]. There were 127 mid-air collisions in the U.S. between
1948 and 1955. Id.
256 See OST, supra note 1, art. VI (“The activities of non-governmental entities
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.”).
257 See, e.g., European STM Report, supra note 3, at 2; ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.
254
255
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of STM.258 The United States’ separate views of space traffic motivated the 2020 NAPA Report to seek funding for STM from
Congress.259 Diverging national and international traffic rules
are reminiscent of the United Kingdom’s and former British
Empire members’ traffic rule to drive on the left side of the
road. In contrast, other international and national rules provide
for driving on the right side of the road. Likewise, the current
budding rules pose a dangerous drift towards parallel but incompatible traffic rules for international space traffic.
The National Space Council (Council) established U.S. space
policy.260 The Council was revived in 2017 by the Trump administration, and the Biden administration has decided to renew
the Council.261 President Biden appointed Vice President Kamala Harris to chair the Council262 and Chirag Parikh as the
new Executive Secretary.263 For its policy review, the Council will
study past policies and make adjustments in accordance with the
space policies of the new administration.264

258 See generally Brian G. Chow, Space Traffic Management in the New Space Age,
STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Winter 2020, at 74. The diverging unilateral STM initiatives
disregard the fact that “we face a crisis that must be urgently addressed in order
to facilitate orbital safety and enhance commercial and research advances.”
NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
259 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 7, 83.
260 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,803, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,429 (June 30, 2017), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,906, 85 Fed. Reg. 10,031 (Feb. 13, 2020) (reviving
the National Space Council).
261 Sandra Erwin, Biden Administration to Continue the National Space Council,
SPACENEWS (Mar. 29, 2021), https://spacenews.com/biden-administration-tocontinue-the-national-space-council/ [https://perma.cc/N7SG-KD6B]; Stephen
Clark, Biden Administration Renews Mandate for National Space Council, SPACEFLIGHT
NOW (Mar. 30, 2021), https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/03/30/biden-administrations-renews-mandate-for-national-space-council/ [https://perma.cc/WQU9GA2H].
262 Jasmine Wright, Harris to Chair the National Space Council, CNN, https://
www.cnn.com/2021/05/01/politics/kamala-harris-chair-national-space-council/
index.html [https://perma.cc/3ZW5-TALF] (May 1, 2021, 3:53 AM).
263 See Jeff Foust, Parikh Named Executive Secretary of National Space Council,
SPACENEWS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://spacenews.com/parikh-named-executive-secretary-of-national-space-council/ [https://perma.cc/6EGY-6S65].
264 See NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 (2020),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/national/national-spacepolicy_20201209.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8R9-AKPD]; Marcie Smith, National
Space Council Priorities Begin to Emerge, SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM (Sept. 9, 2021,
10:45 PM), https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/national-space-council-priorities-begin-to-emerge/ [https://perma.cc/26UQ-TEFX].
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THE NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

OF THE

The 2013 Policy Statement issued by President Obama acknowledged that compliance with U.S. law and regulations, treaties, and other international regulations is the foundation for
U.S. regulation of commercial space.265 Toward that objective,
President Obama placed NASA in charge of space exploration,
assigned the DOD with responsibility for national security, and
charged the DOC with the regulation of remote sensing satellites and support for regulatory activities of other government
agencies.266
The DOT bore many responsibilities under the policy statement. Among them, the DOT issued launch licenses; supervised
non-governmental satellite launches and reentries; promoted
commercial space; required licensed commercial operators to
share liability risks with the U.S. government; promoted the establishment of international safety, interoperability standards,
and recommended practices; and was tasked with developing orbital debris mitigation practices through its licensing
procedures.267
C.

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S SPACE POLICY

The 2018 Trump White House Policy Directives favored a
light touch of government regulation of space commerce.268
White House Policy Directive-2 adopted streamlining commercial space decision-making by the DOT, DOC, DOD, NASA, and
the FCC.269 It intended to reorganize the DOC so it could take
the lead in space commerce regulation.270
265 See NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY, NASA 8 (2013), https://
www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/national_space_transportation_policy_11212013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL2AZR4M]. The policy was later modified by the National and Commercial Space
Programs Act. 51 U.S.C. §§ 10101–71302.
266 See NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY, supra note 265, at 26.
267 Id. at 5.
268 See, e.g., NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. Corporate social responsibility
“should be viewed as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, increasingly
effective government regulation.” See Forest L. Reinhardt, Robert N. Stavins &
Richard H. K. Vietor, Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens, 2
REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 219, 236 (2008).
269 See Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 10, §§ 2(d), 3(b).
270 Id. § 4.
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White House Policy Directive-3 reinforced the policy proposal
for the DOC to lead.271 It prescribed that the DOC shall (1)
maintain a database of space objects, (2) establish international
data standards, (3) distribute space object tracking data to national and international operators, (4) improve the description
of orbiting space objects, (5) establish standards for the assessment of possible collision dangers, and (6) develop operating
guidelines for large constellations to be used in authorizing and
supervising commercial space.272 Furthermore, the Trump administration tasked the DOC to develop an Earth observation
and preservation plan and distribute observed traffic data.273
D.

THE 2020 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REPORT

The NAPA Report must be read with the knowledge that the
policies it is based on are shifting.274 The NAPA Report, ordered
by the DOC and completed before the 2020 election, could not
have considered the possible changes that the Biden administration might require. The NAPA Report recommends a light
touch governmental regulation of commercial space,275 views
STM as “a data management function, rather than principally as
a task of managing space traffic,”276 and describes the study as
“an independent, unbiased assessment.”277 The NAPA Report,
having been prepared during the Trump administration, was
strongly influenced by the two White House Policy Directives
that had been previously adopted, which advocated for DOC to
be the lead administrative agency.278 The NAPA Report notably
concludes with a request that Congress adopt legislation authorizing and funding the DOC to become the lead agency.279
The NAPA Report recognizes that present collision avoidance
is insufficient.280 Currently, satellite operators use Space SituaSee Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 10, § 6(c).
See id. §§ 5–6.
273 See id.
274 The NAPA Report was guided by the White House policy statements, treating them as thoroughly vetted within the administration. In reaching its conclusions, the NAPA Panel used the Institutional Analysis and Design framework.
NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 13; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
275 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
276 Id. at 3.
277 Id. at 2, 10.
278 Id. at 35.
279 See id. at 102. Congress has not supported the desired reorganization.
280 Id. at 70.
271
272
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tional Awareness to identify collision dangers.281 Collision safety
will require better tracking of both satellites and debris and the
adoption of active STM services.282 While recognizing that STM
is urgently needed, the NAPA Report proposes to rely on private
contractors for additional STM services, requiring the establishment of a “fee-for” service for activities beyond basic services.283
The DOT and the FAA presently perform the collision avoidance management tasks but are limited under 51 U.S.C.
§ 50901.284 If the NAPA Report recommendations were followed, FAA oversight at the licensing and oversight stages would
be weakened by the DOC’s promotional considerations.285
E.
1.

EVALUATION

OF THE

NAPA REPORT

The NAPA Report’s Failure to Recognize the Outer Space Treaty

The OST forms the legal basis for unilateral U.S. government
STM, and unilateral national laws must comply with the OST.286
Article VI of the OST commits all the states to ensure that commercial operators comply with the OST.287 The OST places a
long list of conditions on space activities by all operators.288 Besides the space law treaties, the U.S. government has agreed to
implement soft laws such as the 2007 Space Debris Guidelines
and the LTS Guidelines to the most feasible and practicable
extent.289
The NAPA Report did not mention other pertinent international arrangements. For example, it fails to mention the four
Global Navigation Satellite Systems currently available for use—
the U.S. Global Positioning Service, Russia’s GLONASS, the European Union’s Galileo, and China’s BeiDou290—and their in281 See id. at 51. Space Situational Awareness requires an examination of satellites and space environments necessary for sustainable, safe, and stable operation.
See id.
282 See id. at 70.
283 See id. at 78.
284 See 51 U.S.C. § 50901(b)(3).
285 DOC leadership would rely on risk management for space commercial market development. See NAPA REPORT supra note 3, at 96.
286 See OST, supra note 1, art. VI; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 53 (explaining the OST).
287 Id.
288 See id. art I.
289 2007 Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 67; LTS Guidelines, supra note
38; see also supra note 203.
290 Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems,
80 J. AIR L. & COM. 365, 366–70 (2015).
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teroperability.291 Another example, the ITU treaties, and most
fundamentally the ITU Constitution, regulate the use of radio
frequencies and the avoidance of harmful interference when using radio frequencies to maneuver orbiting satellites.292
2.

NAPA’s Failure to Consider Essential Implementation of the
Outer Space Treaty

The light touch space traffic management recommended by
the NAPA Report fails to implement the outer space treaties
fully. Congress has not implemented outer space commercial activities on celestial bodies. By its inaction, Congress has failed to
select a U.S. government agency to authorize commercial activities in outer space, such as granting licenses to engage in mining at designated locations on the Moon. The legal problem is
that Article II of the OST prohibits the national appropriation
of outer space by claim of sovereignty, use, or any means whatsoever.293 Congress now needs to adopt legislation granting a government agency the power to authorize commercial uses of
outer space; however, such legislation must comply with the
OST, and the U.S. implementing language must accord with the
common interpretations of other states party to the OST.294 The
recent U.S. commercial confrontations with China and Russia
over promising space technology make such conflicts likely.295
The assertion of rights to exclusive mining sites on the Moon is
another illustration of a potential conflict.296 The NAPA Report
did not consider conflicting STM regulations among states, yet
these conflicts need to be resolved.

See id. at 403, 406, 409, 413.
See ITU Constitution, supra note 147, arts. 44, 45.
293 OST, supra note 1, art. II.
294 “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1),
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
295 See, e.g., Greg Autry, Beijing’s Fight for the Final Frontier, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr.
2, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/02/beijing-is-taking-thefinal-frontier-space-china/ [https://perma.cc/97KM-VU4Z]; Clay Dillow,
America’s Weapon in the US-Russia Space War, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2014/
06/17/americas-weapon-in-the-us-russia-space-war.html [https://perma.cc/
6TYM-G37S] (June 18, 2014, 12:44 PM).
296 See Larsen, supra note 158, at 9.
291
292
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The NAPA Report’s Assumption That Promotion of Space
Commerce Rather Than Safety in Outer Space Is the Most
Important Element in Government Regulation

The NAPA Report envisions that the DOC, as lead agency,
would act as an advocate for the space industry.297 Consequently, the NAPA Report recommends that the DOC becomes
the main U.S. government regulatory agency for outer space.298
The NAPA Report recommends that STM regulation use a light
touch approach consisting of traffic data management.299
If the light touch was put into practice, STM would depend
on space commerce operators regulating themselves to the
greatest possible extent.300 Self-regulation invites multiple headaches. First, STM would likely be based on national and possibly
international standards and recommended practices because of
inevitable coordination with other space commerce operators
worldwide. Questions then arise whether foreign space operators should be tracked. Would there be a consortium of private
third-party operators of different nationalities? Second, tracking
space objects would be accomplished using third-party contractors, and the individual entities would have to cover the cost of
STM services.301 The cost of private tracking (if possible) would
be considerable, if not prohibitive. Third, though DOD tracking
would continue, it would become solely directed at military
targets. The perceived self-regulated STM scheme still faces the
obstacle of Congress’s approval to fund civilian tracking
activities.
In sum, the Biden administration will likely have different priorities that will change the supporting foundation assumed by
297 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 64 (indicating that the DOC will act “as an
industry advocate within the Executive Branch.”); see also id. at 83.
298 See id. at 4.
299 See id. at 2, 3. Interestingly, the NAPA Report expresses confidence that
space data management will be encrypted, so that it will be secure from jamming
and spoofing. See id. at 72. The recent Solar Winds experience with failed encryptions may undermine that experience. See Dina Temple-Raston, A ‘Worst
Nightmare’ Cyberattack: The Untold Story of the SolarWinds Hack, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 16, 2021, 10:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/16/985439655/aworst-nightmare-cyberattack-the-untold-story-of-the-solarwinds-hack [https://
perma.cc/4RW5-QZAM]; see also Paul B. Larsen, Will Harmful Interference Bring
GPS Down?, 86 J. AIR. L. & COM. 3, 41 (2021).
300 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 98 (“A minority of [stakeholders/experts]
express concerns about the Department’s lack of regulatory experience and its
ability to balance regulatory (safety) and business promotion.”).
301 See id. at 78.
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the NAPA Report. More importance should be given to the improvement of the congestive environment of outer space. Advocacy of, and support for, the policies recommended by the
NAPA Report had the strong support of the former Secretary of
Commerce, but the Department has new leadership. The NAPA
Report’s prevalence of commercial promotion over the critical
and deteriorating outer space safety situation caused by the congestion in outer space should serve as sufficient cause for reevaluation of the policy.
4.

Failure to Consider All Stakeholders

The NAPA Report recommends that the needs of all stakeholders must be taken into consideration in establishing new
collision-avoidance management.302 However, the study mainly
focused on the needs of U.S. space commerce.303 The NAPA Report appears to advocate for space commerce and discount all
international and national interests of many stakeholders304
such as astronomers and scientists.305
The NAPA Report also fails to mention the special rights of
the developing countries that are protected under the OST.306 It
does not consider other countries’ broad interests under the
OST, the Liability Convention, or the Registration Convention.
It acknowledges the international nature of outer space,307 but it
fails to acknowledge the soft law international regulations, such
as the 2007 Space Debris Guidelines and the LTS Guidelines.
5.

Competitive Interests Within the Space Commerce Industry

Information must be shared for successful STM, and the
NAPA Report favors an open, “non-proprietary architecture” approach to traffic data in collective data banks.308 This is difficult
to arrange because proprietary information is valuable to the
owners and must be protected. To illustrate, the 2021 agreement between NASA and SpaceX (Starlink) includes data sharSee id. at 7–8.
See id. at 47.
304 For a more extensive discussion of stakeholders, see Larsen, supra note 19.
305 See Larsen, supra note 19, at 13–15; discussion supra Section II.D. Note the
priority of space exploration in Article I of the OST.
306 See OST, supra note 1, art. I (“[Space exploration] shall be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”).
307 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 47–48.
308 Id. at 71.
302
303
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ing to avoid collisions and shares important STM information
about satellite launch dates, target orbits, trajectories, and proximity to the ISS.309 However, the agreement extensively restricts
intellectual property and proprietary data rights from being
shared.310 Thus, parties in traffic sharing agreements will logically want to restrict STM-related information that contains essential business information. That means the data collected by
the OST operators that goes to the essence of their business will
not be shared. Therefore, competing commercial space operators cannot share much of their information.
STM information is currently collected and distributed to its
subscribers by the Space Data Association, but the information
does not satisfy the needs of effective international STM.311 Nor
can the commercial space operators be expected to establish
and operate a sophisticated space-object tracking operation like
the one the DOD currently manages. An experienced, technically knowledgeable, and neutral government agency like the
FAA is best equipped to develop a tracking operation. The advantage of an independent body that is not subject to competition considerations will become increasingly apparent as
satellites begin to collide as they are predicted to do.312
6.

The NAPA Report’s Confusion About Likelihood of Collisions in
Outer Space

The NAPA Report concludes that a collision in outer space is
“unlikely.”313 That conclusion conflicts with many stakeholders’
views that outer space is in a crisis and that collision with space
debris is highly probable.314 It is known that space debris will
frequently collide with other space debris.315 Furthermore, colliSee NASA AGREEMENT WITH SPACEX, supra note 11, art. 4.
See id. art. 9. Proprietary data is defined as “[d]ata embodying trade secrets
developed at private expense or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential, and that includes a restrictive notice.” Id.
311 Peterson et al., supra note 40, at 8 (“Current capabilities will be challenged
to meet the demands of future space operators. Without sufficient data quality,
the false alarm rates will be too high for an effective STM system to function.”).
312 See ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3, 8.
313 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 54.
314 See, e.g., Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 68, at 2637, 2640; Roulette, supra
note 8; Kramer, supra note 26; EUR. SPACE AGENCY, supra note 26.
315 See FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/
Safety_Security/Space_Debris/FAQ_Frequently_asked_questions [https://
perma.cc/A6JZ-XVMG] (explaining the Kessler Syndrome, which states that
space debris of critical mass will fragment in further collisions leading to a cascading chain of activities).
309
310
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sions such as that of the Cosmos and Iridium satellites have already happened and indicate a higher probability of collision
than the NAPA Report assumed.316
V.
A.

BEST WAY TO GO

THE FULLY IMPLEMENTED OUTER SPACE TREATY IS

THE

LAW

Following agreed-upon international laws that establish a rulebased order in outer space is beneficial and constitutionally required. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that “all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”317
Thus, the U.S. is obligated to observe the requirements of the
OST and other international laws.318 Despite references to the
OST, the NAPA Report assumes that enforcement of treaty obligations is a matter of choice. However, it is the law—violations
of the OST will lead to conflicting safety rules of the road and
collisions in outer space. Other consequences include the risk
that it could even lead to military engagements in outer
space.319 Outer space commerce will increasingly be subject to
international guidelines and regulations, such as the 2007 Space
Debris Guidelines, the LTS Guidelines, and future STM guidelines. When the guidelines are adopted as mandatory national
regulations, they will require national enforcement. The department charged with legally authorizing and overseeing space
commerce to ensure compliance with international law should
be a neutral government agency and not a department preoccupied with promoting commerce.

316 NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 (“While the expected value of destroyed
wealth because of collisions is currently small because of the low probability of a
collision, this price-tag can quickly become significant if future collisions result in
runaway debris growth.”).
317 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432
(1920). Treaties must be implemented by legislation unless they are clearly selfexecuting. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952).
318 See, e.g., NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22; IISL Statement, supra note 2.
319 The U.S. and other space powers now consider outer space to be a military
domain. See, e.g., William J. Broad, How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest
Between the U.S. and China, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/
us/politics/trump-biden-pentagon-space-missiles-satellite.html [https://
perma.cc/3792-6Q9R] (May 6, 2021).
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NEW U.S. LEGISLATION REQUIRED

The 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act only implements
part of the OST Article VI authority to license non-governmental entities to use outer space.320 The licensing of outer space
activities is still to be authorized.321 Therefore, new legislation
should establish a separate government decision-maker other
than the FAA to authorize and promote economic outer space
licensing and supervision. In the interim, such authorization
could be performed well by a separate DOT governmental office
similar to the DOT office that handles airline economic issues.
In the long term, a separate space-business regulatory agency
like the former Civil Aeronautics Board322 may need to be
charged with authorizing and supervising commercial uses of
outer space, while the FAA maintains its authority to regulate
launches and reentries. The regulatory agency would address
growing commercial activities such as mining on celestial bodies.323 Such authority should align with international law (particularly Article VI of the OST) in the same way the 1984
Commercial Space Launch Act did.324
C.

FAA REGULATION

OF

SAFETY ENLARGED

The FAA’s responsibilities regarding space commerce safety
regulation should be enlarged to include the supervision of traffic rules. Such responsibility should include the duty to track
space objects if the decision is made to separate civilians from
the military’s (DOD) tracking of space objects. Space safety regulation should include safety issues relating to collisions between satellites and collisions between satellites and space
debris. The possibility of space debris collision is a more serious
issue because space debris cannot be maneuvered.
320 See Commercial Space Launch Act § 2(7), 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7) (regulating launches, reentries, and services of non-governmental entities).
321 Congress needs to authorize a government agency to license and supervise
commercial space activities between launch and reentry. The authority should
accord with applicable international law.
322 See generally A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [https://perma.cc/GJ7J-JQLN] (Jan.
4, 2017, 4:42 PM) (nothing that the Civil Aeronautics Board’s responsibilities included “economic regulation of the airlines.”).
323 See generally Larsen, supra note 158, at 3–8.
324 The new law should state that it complies with the international law obligations of the U.S. See Commercial Space Launch Act § 2(7), 51 U.S.C.
§ 50901(a)(7).
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All economic-promoting regulations of commercial space
should be removed from the FAA because of the inherent conflict between the safety and promotion of commerce.325 The recent changes in the FAA safety regulations of launch and
reentry operations,326 which were changed to conform with the
light touch policy of the Trump administration, also need to be
reexamined.
Military space safety issues should remain outside and separate from the regulation of commercial space. International
agreement on international safety rules for national military
spacecraft would be complicated, if not impossible, to establish
by negotiation. Dividing military and civil vehicles is a pragmatic
solution demonstrated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).327
Consequently, Congress should provide the FAA with the legal authority over all safety activities of commercial space operators. The FAA prioritizes safety. It focuses on the dangers of
collision between space debris, other space traffic, and spacecraft’s safe design and launch.328 The FAA also manages the registration of space objects and the approval of payloads.329 Safety
is becoming the most important government function for nongovernmental operators because of the increasing congestion in
LEO, in particular the growing collision dangers of space debris.330 If the DOD must shift its tracking activities to a civilian
agency, then the FAA is the agency with the most technical capa325 Outer space safety is often a matter of human survival as illustrated by the
experience of the four astronauts on their way on a Space-X satellite to the Space
station when they suddenly had to prepare for collision with space debris. See
Kenneth Chang, A Piece of Debris Whizzes Past the Crew Dragon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/science/space-junk.html [https:/
/perma.cc/FMB4-E3TZ].
326 14 C.F.R. § 450.169 (2021).
327 See ICAO, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., https://www.icao.int/about-icao/
Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/K6Q2-EEU3]; see also ITU Constitution,
supra note 147, art. 48 (allowing exclusion of military uses of radiofrequencies
from ITU administration).
328 See generally NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 123.
329 Payload Reviews, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/space/licenses/payload_reviews [https://perma.cc/5BVZ-Z99M] (Jan. 28, 2020, 2:46
PM); NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 95 (“FAA leads space inter-agency coordination of registration and payload reviews.”).
330 The inherent conflict between joint regulation of safety and of commercial
promotion is illustrated by the fiasco of the FAA taking business concerns into
consideration in certifying the Boeing 737 MAX. See David Shepardson, U.S. Audit Report Cites ‘Weaknesses’ in FAA Certification of Boeing 737 MAX, REUTERS, https:/
/www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max/u-s-audit-report-cites-weaknesses-
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bility for that task due to its experience with trafficking and collision avoidance maneuvers of airplanes. The FAA is the current
administration’s best choice to assume U.S. government leadership of STM, and the Council should therefore revisit this option.331 What is needed is a separate FAA for outer space with
the same responsibilities for space that the FAA has for control
of air traffic.332
D.

ADEQUATE BUDGET AUTHORITY PROVIDED

BY

CONGRESS

Managing the congestion and traffic crisis in outer space will
require considerable government expenditures. Space commerce management at the national level is complicated because
the territory is inherently international.333 The NAPA Report
proposes large-scale commercial space self-management and establishing an extensive fee-based system for private collision
avoidance services.334 Recall that the aviation experience with
self-management of air traffic was disastrous;335 the Grand Canyon aircraft accident triggered the establishment of the FAA.336
Transferring that government response earlier is ideal because
spacecraft and space objects travel faster than aircraft. Space
traffic separation and collision avoidance are even more challenging than aviation traffic separation, and therefore calls for a
central, knowledgeable body to regulate space activities
proactively.
E.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

OF

OUTER SPACE

Outer space congestion—particularly the LEO congestion of
space debris and prominent constellations of small satellites—
and the scarcity of frequencies and orbits require more than the
safety and economic oversight. It also requires environmental
oversight similar to that provided by the Environmental Protection Agency over aviation. Environmental oversight may require
environmental impact assessments of space and economic activiin-faa-certification-of-boeing-737-max-idUSKBN2AO2P6 [https://perma.cc/
6CD2-3PX7] (Feb. 24, 2021, 2:35 PM).
331 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77. For recent U.S. Congressional development on the issue, see discussion supra note 228.
332 See Foust, supra note 9.
333 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
334 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 78.
335 See Bjorkman, supra note 255.
336 See supra note 255.
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ties on celestial bodies.337 Congress should legislate national
oversight, and international bodies like UNCOPUOS must consider international protection of astronomical observations
against space commerce activity.338
F.

UNCOPUOS: MULTILATERAL VERSUS UNILATERAL SPACE
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

By adopting the LTS guidelines, UNCOPUOS has begun to
develop basic rules for the commercial exploitation of outer
space. The UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee has started to discuss multilateral STM guidelines.339 The 1979 Moon Treaty and
ITU Radio Regulations would be useful precedents for the Subcommittee because they contain clear, detailed rules.340 In the
UNCOPUOS context, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) international space debris mitigation
guidelines could be a useful precedent for the similar coordination of international STM guidelines. The IADC authored the
universally accepted 2007 Space Debris Guidelines.341 The IADC
is a coordination committee of thirteen major space powers, including the U.S. (NASA), Russia (the Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities (ROSCOSMOS)), China (the China
National Space Administration (CNSA)), India (the Indian
Space Research Organisation (ISRO)), and the ESA.342 It is a
small forum where the U.S., China, Russia, and the ESA can
meet to negotiate specific space issues.343 Since space debris is
See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
Several articles of the OST already provide environmental protection of
outer space. See OST, supra note 1, arts. I, IV, IX.
339 See UNCOPUOS Adoption, supra note 33, ¶ 12 (“The Subcommittee will
consider the item on general exchange of views on the legal aspects of space
traffic management . . . .”); Boucher, supra note 33.
340 1979 Moon Agreement, supra note 1 (“Taking into account the need to
define and develop the provisions of these international instruments in relation
to the moon and other celestial bodies, having regard to further progress in the
exploration and use of outer space . . . .”); see also id. art. 11(5) (“State Parties to
this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international régime . . . to
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon . . . .”). An example
provision in the ITU Constitution is that operators are only being assigned
cleared radio frequencies. See ITU Constitution, supra note 147, arts. 1(2)(a),
14(2)(a), 44(2); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 210–18; see also Paul B. Larsen,
Space Traffic Management Standards, 83 J. AIR. L. & COM. 359, 369, 374 (2018).
341 2007 Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 67.
342 What’s IADC, INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM., https://
iadc-home.org/what_iadc [https://perma.cc/GXG9-EEVF].
343 See id.
337
338
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the major STM issue, it could be considered within the scope of
the IADC.
Although international standards are the goal, a lack of agreement among states will delay any issuance of a formal standard.
The issue of diverging unilateral STM still threatens to manifest
and cause conflicts and collisions. As the largest user of outer
space, the U.S. has an excellent opportunity to influence the
increasing number of foreign outer space users with its established STM practices and lead other countries to join in establishing a safe outer space business environment.
G.

ESTABLISHMENT

INTERNATIONAL OUTER SPACE
AGENCY

OF AN

Space safety requires establishing a separate, international
agency to coordinate and establish uniform international safety
standards and recommended practices. UNCOPUOS is not an
international regulatory agency capable of constant examination, establishment, and oversight of space safety guidelines for
dealing with collision hazards in outer space. UNCOPUOS is a
U.N. General Assembly Committee.344 Its decisions are made by
consensus, enabling one country to block even voluntary international rules such as space debris guidelines.345 The present
stalemate on the adoption of international STM guidelines regulating commercial exploitation of outer space resources impedes commercial activities and leads to military conflict. The
absence of such an international agency leads states to issue unilateral regulations of outer space commercial activities. An international outer space agency similar to the ITU (which
established intentional radio regulations and administered the
International Frequency Registration Board) must be created.
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices for International
Aviation would be a useful model for a spacecraft’s orbiting nonsovereign outer space.346 A separate international space safety
agency that can make decisions quickly is needed, but UNE.g., Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 169.
See generally What Does It Mean When a Decision Is Taken “By Consensus”?, U.N.
DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR., https://ask.un.org/faq/260981 [https://perma.cc/
64Z6-FTLA] (Sept. 8, 2021).
346 See Larsen, supra note 238, at 515–16; The Need for an Integrated Regulatory
Regime for Aviation and Space: ICAO for Space?, in 17 STUDIES IN SPACE POLICY
xii–xiii (Ram S. Jakhu, Tommaso Sgobba & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2011).
344
345
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COPUOS remains the international forum for multilateral STM
decision-making until then.347
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The Presidential Space Council should reexamine the current
drift toward unilateral rules of the road for non-sovereign outer
space and should focus on negotiating common international
rules of the road. Space traffic safety should be given precedence over the promotion of space commerce. The NAPA Report’s recommendation to establish the light touch regulation
of STM does not satisfy the current outer space safety. The responsibility of the FAA for space traffic safety should be reaffirmed and redefined to include other space safety
responsibilities. The FAA’s responsibility for promotion of space
commerce should be reassigned to a different administration in
the DOT, similar to the division of economics and safety in air
transport. Space commerce industry must have a secure and safe
space environment founded on rules-based order to compete
fairly. However, non-governmental space commercial policy
must be weighed in the context of other related U.S. national
policy priorities. Fair competition for the space commerce industry must not result in the active governmental promotion of
one stakeholder at the expense of other stakeholders. Science,
astronomy, and the exploration of outer space must be given
the attention it deserves.348 New national priorities on climate
change;349 related solar energy options;350 and policies on social,
economic, and national security issues must also be weighed in
establishing national STM policy.351
See UNCOPUOS Adoption, supra note 33, ¶ 12.
See discussion supra Section II.D; see also Larsen, supra note 19, at 13–15
(discussing multiple reasons why scientists’ and astronomers’ continuing role in
space exploration is important).
349 See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7621 (Jan. 27, 2021); see
generally Larsen, Climate Change Management in the Space Age, supra note 103, at
104.
350 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 269–74.
351 See supra Section II.F; see also Erwin, supra note 52.
347
348

